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A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, virtue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, vertue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]
printed by S. Kneeland, 1754
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
The Thing which makes Sin hateful, is that by which it deserves Punishment; which is but the Expression of Hatred. And that which renders Virtue lovely, is the same with that, on the Account of which, it is fit to receive Praise and Reward; which are but the Expressions of Esteem and Love. But that which makes Vice hateful, is it's hateful Nature; and that which renders Virtue lovely, is it's amiable Nature. 'Tis a certain Beauty or Deformity that are inherent in that good or evil Will, which is the Soul of Virtue and Vice (and not in the Occasion of it) which is their Worthiness of Esteem or Disesteem, Praise or Dispraise, according to the common Sense of Mankind. If the Cause or Occasion of the Rise of an hateful Disposition or Act of Will, be also hateful; suppose another antecedent evil Will; that is entirely another Sin, and deserves Punishment by it self, under a distinct Consideration. There is Worthiness of Dispraise in the Nature of an evil Volition, and not wholly in some foregoing Act which is it's Cause; otherwise the evil Volition which is the Effect, is no moral Evil, any more than Sickness, or some other natural Calamity, which arises from a Cause morally evil.
The Thing which makes Sin hateful, is that by which it deserves Punishment; which is but the Expression of Hatred. And that which renders Vertue lovely, is the same with that, on the Account of which, it is fit to receive Praise and Reward; which are but the Expressions of Esteem and Love. But that which makes Vice hateful, is it's hateful Nature; and that which renders Vertue lovely, is it's amiable Nature. 'Tis a certain Beauty or Deformity that are inherent in that good or evil Will, which is the Soul of Vertue and Vice (and not in the Occasion of it) which is their Worthiness of Esteem or Disesteem, Praise or Dispraise, according to the common Sense of Mankind. If the Cause or Occasion of the Rise of an hateful Disposition or Act of Will, be also hateful; suppose another antecedent evil Will; that is entirely another Sin, and deserves Punishment by it self, under a distinct Consideration. There is Worthiness of Dispraise in the Nature of an evil Volition, and not wholly in some foregoing Act which is it's Cause; otherwise the evil Volition which is the Effect, is no moral Evil, any more than Sickness, or some other natural Calamity, which arises from a Cause morally evil.