A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…

Thus for Instance, Ingratitude is hateful and worthy of Dispraise, according to common Sense; not because something as bad, or worse than Ingratitude, was the Cause that produced it; but because it is hateful in it self, by it's own inherent Deformity. So the Love of Virtue is amiable, and worthy of Praise, not merely because something else went before this Love of Virtue in our Minds, which caused it to take Place there; for Instance our own Choice; we chose to love Virtue, and by some Method or other wrought our selves into the Love of it; but because of the Amiableness and Condecency of such a Disposition and Inclination of Heart. If that was the Case, that we did choose to love Virtue, and so produced that Love in our selves, this Choice it self could be no otherwise amiable or praise-worthy, than as Love to Virtue, or some other amiable Inclination, was exercised and implied in it. If that Choice was amiable at all, it must be so on Account of some amiable Quality in the Nature of the Choice. If we chose to love Virtue, not in Love to Virtue, or any Thing that was good, and exercised no sort of good Disposition in the Choice, the Choice it self was not virtuous, nor worthy of any Praise, according to common Sense, because the Choice was not of a good Nature.

Thus for Instance, Ingratitude is hateful and worthy of Dispraise, according to common Sense; not because something as bad, or worse than Ingratitude, was the Cause that produced it; but because it is hateful in it self, by it's own inherent Deformity. So the Love of Vertue is amiable, and worthy of Praise, not meerly because something else went before this Love of Vertue in our Minds, which caused it to take Place there; for Instance our own Choice; we chose to love Vertue, and by some Method or other wrought our selves into the Love of it; but because of the Amiableness and Condecency of such a Disposition and Inclination of Heart. If that was the Case, that we did chuse to love Vertue, and so produced that Love in our selves, this Choice it self could be no otherwise amiable or praise-worthy, than as Love to Vertue, or some other amiable Inclination, was exercised and implied in it. If that Choice was amiable at all, it must be so on Account of some amiable Quality in the Nature of the Choice. If we chose to love Vertue, not in Love to Vertue, or any Thing that was good, and exercised no sort of good Disposition in the Choice, the Choice it self was not vertuous, nor worthy of any Praise, according to common Sense, because the Choice was not of a good Nature.