A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…

So that according to their Notion of an Act, considered with Regard to it's Consequences, these following▪ Things are all essential to it; viz. That it should be necessary, and not necessary; that it should be from a Cause, and no Cause; that it should be the Fruit of Choice and Design, and not the Fruit of Choice and Design; that it should be the Beginning of Motion or Exertion, and yet consequent on previous Exertion; that it should be before it is; that it should spring immediately out of Indifference and Equilibrium, and yet be the Effect of ⟨p. 201⟩Preponderation; that it should be self-originated, and also have it's Original from something else; that it is what the Mind causes it self, of it's own Will, and can produce or prevent, according to it's Choice or Pleasure, and yet what the Mind has no Power to prevent, it precluding all previous Choice in the Affair.

So that an Act, according to their metaphysical Notion of it, is something of which there is no Idea; 'tis nothing but a Confusion of the Mind, excited by Words without any distinct Meaning, and is an absolute Non-entity; and that in two Respects; (1.) There is nothing in the World that ever was, is, or can be, to answer the Things which must belong to it's Description, according to what they suppose to be essential to it. And (2.) There neither is, nor ever was, nor can be, any Notion or Idea to answer the Word, as they use and explain it. For if we should suppose any such Notion, it would many Ways destroy it self. But 'tis impossible, any Idea or Notion should subsist in the Mind, whose very Nature and Essence, which constitutes it, destroys it.— If some learned Philosopher, who had been abroad, in giving an Account of the curious Observations he had made in his Travels, should say, He had been in Terra del Fuego, and there had seen an Animal, which he calls by a certain Name, that begat and brought forth it self, and yet had a Sire and a Dam distinct from it self; that it had an Appetite, and was hungry before it had a Being; that his Master, who led him, and governed him at his Pleasure, was always governed by him, and driven by him where he pleased; that when he moved, he always took a Step before the first Step; that he went with his Head first, and yet always went Tail foremost; and this, tho' he had neither Head nor Tail: It would be no Impudence at all, to tell such a Traveller, tho' a learned Man, that He himself had no Notion or Idea of such an Animal as he gave an Account of, and never had, nor ever would have.