A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…

In like Manner, if Things in themselves good and desirable are absolutely impossible, with a natural Impossibility, the universal Reason of Mankind teaches, that this wholly and perfectly excuses Persons in their not doing them.

And 'tis also a plain Dictate of common Sense, that if the doing Things in themselves Good, or avoiding Things in themselves Evil, is not absolutely impossible, with such a natural Impossibility, but very difficult, with a natural Difficulty; that is, a Difficulty prior to, and not at all consisting in Will and Inclination it self, and which would remain the same, let the Inclination be what it will; then a Person's Neglect or Omission is excused in some Measure, tho' not wholly; his Sin is less aggravated, than if the Thing to be done were easy. And if instead of Difficulty and Hindrance, there be a contrary natural Propensity in the State of Things, to the Thing to be done, or Effect to be brought to pass, abstracted from any Consideration of the Inclination of the Heart; tho' the Propensity be not so great as to amount to a natural Necessity; yet being some Approach to it, so that the doing the good Thing be very much from this natural Tendency in the State of Things, and but little from a good Inclination; then it is a Dictate of common Sense, that there is so much the less Virtue in what is done; and so it is less Praise-worthy and rewardable. The Reason is easy, viz. because such a natural Propensity or Tendency is an Approach to natural Necessity; and the greater the Propensity, still so much the nearer is the Approach to Necessity. And therefore as natural Necessity takes away or shuts out all Virtue, so this Propensity approaches to an Abolition of Virtue; that is, it diminishes it. And on the other Hand, natural Difficulty in the State of Things is an Approach to natural Impossibility. And as the latter, when it is complete and absolute, wholly takes away Blame; so such Difficulty takes away some Blame, or diminishes Blame; and makes the Thing done to be less worthy of Punishment.

And 'tis also a plain Dictate of common Sense, that if the doing Things in themselves Good, or avoiding Things in themselves Evil, is not absolutely impossible, with such a natural Impossibility, but very difficult, with a natural Difficulty; that is, a Difficulty prior to, and not at all consisting in Will and Inclination it self, and which would remain the same, let the Inclination be what it will; then a Person's Neglect or Omission is excused in some Measure, tho' not wholly; his Sin is less aggravated, than if the Thing to be done were easy. And if instead of Difficulty and Hindrance, there be a contrary natural Propensity in the State of Things, to the Thing to be done, or Effect to be brought to pass, abstracted from any Consideration of the Inclination of the Heart; tho' the Propensity be not so great as to amount to a natural Necessity; yet being some Approach to it, so that the doing the good Thing be very much from this natural Tendency in the State of Things, and but little from a good Inclination; then it is a Dictate of common Sense, that there is so much the less Vertue in what is done; and so it is less Praise-worthy and rewardable. The Reason is easy, viz. because such a natural Propensity or Tendency is an Approach to natural Necessity; and the greater the Propensity, still so much the nearer is the Approach to Necessity. And therefore as natural Necessity takes away or shuts out all Vertue, so this Propensity approaches to an Abolition of Vertue; that is, it diminishes it. And on the other Hand, natural Difficulty in the State of Things is an Approach to natural Impossibility. And as the latter, when it is compleat and absolute, wholly takes away Blame; so such Difficulty takes away some Blame, or diminishes Blame; and makes the Thing done to be less worthy of Punishment.