A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…

II. If it were inconsistent with the common Sense of Mankind, that Men should be either to be blamed or commended in any Volitions they have or fail of, in Case of moral Necessity or Impossibility; then it would surely also be agreeable to the same Sense and Reason of Mankind, that the nearer ⟨p. 215⟩the Case approaches to such a moral Necessity or Impossibility, either through a strong antecedent moral Propensity on the one Hand, ^*or a great antecedent Opposition and Difficulty on the other, the nearer does it approach to a being neither blameable nor commendable; so that Acts exerted with such preceding Propensity would be worthy of proportionably less Praise; and when omitted, the Act being attended with such Difficulty, the Omission would be worthy of the less Blame. It is so, as was observed before, with natural Necessity and Impossibility, Propensity and Difficulty: As 'tis a plain Dictate of the Sense of all Mankind, that natural Necessity and Impossibility takes away all Blame and Praise; and therefore, that the nearer the Approach is to these through previous Propensity or Difficulty, so Praise and Blame are proportionably diminished. And if it were as much a Dictate of common Sense, that moral Necessity of doing, or Impossibility of avoiding, takes away all Praise and Blame, as that natural Necessity or Impossibility does this; then, by a perfect Parity of Reason, it would be as much the Dictate of common Sense, that an Approach to moral Necessity of doing, or Impossibility of avoiding, diminishes Praise and Blame, as that an Approach to natural Necessity and Impossibility does so. 'Tis equally the Voice of common Sense, that Persons are excusable in Part, in neglecting Things difficult against their Wills, as that they are excusable wholly in neglecting Things impossible against their Wills. And if it made no Difference, whether the Impossibility were natural and against the Will, or moral, lying in the Will, with regard to Excusableness; so neither would it make any Difference, whether the Difficulty, or Approach to Necessity be natural against the Will, or moral, lying in the Propensity of the Will.

II. If it were inconsistent with the common Sense of Mankind, that Men should be either to be blamed or commended in any Volitions they have or fail of, in Case of moral Necessity or Impossibility; then it would surely also be agreable to the same Sense and Reason of Mankind, that the nearer