That all the seeming Force of such Objections and Exclamations must arise from an Imagination, that there is some Sort of Privilege or Dignity in being without such a moral Necessity, as will make it impossible to do any other, than always choose what is wisest and best; as tho' there were some Disadvantage, Meanness and Subjection, in such a Necessity; a Thing by which the Will was confined, kept under, and held in Servitude by something, which, as it were, maintained a strong and invincible Power and Dominion over it, by Bonds that held him fast, and that he could by no Means deliver himself from. Whereas, this must be all mere Imagination and Delusion. 'Tis no Disadvantage or Dishonour to a Being, necessarily to act in the most excellent and happy Manner, from the necessary Perfection of his own Nature. This argues no Imperfection, Inferiority or Dependence, nor any Want of Dignity, Privilege or Ascendancy. †'Tis not inconsistent with ⟨p. 233⟩the absolute, and most perfect Sovereignty of God. The Sovereignty of God is his Ability and Authority to do whatever pleases Him; whereby He doth according to his Will in the Armies of Heaven, and amongst the Inhabitants of the Earth, and none can stay his Hand, or say unto him, What dost thou?—The following Things belong to the Sovereignty of God; viz. (1.) Supreme, universal, and infinite Power; whereby he is able to do what he pleases, without Control; without any Confinement of that Power, without any Subjection in the least Measure to any other Power; and so without any Hindrance or Restraint, that it should be either impossible, or at all difficult, for him to accomplish his Will; and without any ⟨p. 234⟩Dependence of his Power on any other Power, from whence it should be derived, or which it should stand in any Need of: So far from this, that all other Power is derived from Him, and is absolutely dependent on Him. (2.) That He has supreme Authority; absolute and most perfect Right to do what He wills, without Subjection to any superior Authority, or any Derivation of Authority from any other, or Limitation by any distinct independent Authority, either superior, equal, or inferior; he being the Head of all Dominion, and Fountain of all Authority; and also without Restraint by any Obligation, implying either Subjection, Derivation, or Dependence, or proper Limitation. (3.)
That all the seeming Force of such Objections and Exclamations must arise from an Imagination, that there is some Sort of Privilege or Dignity in being without such a moral Necessity, as will make it impossible to do any other, than always chuse what is wisest and best; as tho' there were some Disadvantage, Meanness and Subjection, in such a Necessity; a Thing by which the Will was confined, kept under, and held in Servitude by something, which, as it were, maintained a strong and invincible Power and Dominion over it, by Bonds that held him fast, and that he could by no Means deliver himself from. Whereas, this must be all meer Imagination and Delusion. 'Tis no Disadvantage or Dishonour to a Being, necessarily to act in the most excellent and happy Manner, from the necessary Perfection of his own Nature. This argues no Imperfection, Inferiority or Dependance, nor any Want of Dignity, Privilege or Ascendancy. †'Tis not inconsistent with ⟨p. 233⟩the absolute, and most perfect Sovereignty of God. The Sovereignty of God is his Ability and Authority to do whatever pleases Him; whereby He doth according to his Will in the Armies of Heaven, and amongst the Inhabitants of the Earth, and none can stay his Hand, or say unto him, What dost thou?—The following Things belong to the Sovereignty of God; viz. (1.) Supreme, universal, and infinite Power; whereby he is able to do what he pleases, without Controul; without any Confinement of that Power, without any Subjection in the least Measure to any other Power; and so without any Hindrance or Restraint, that it should be either impossible, or at all difficult, for him to accomplish his Will; and without any ⟨p. 234⟩Dependance of his Power on any other Power, from whence it should be derived, or which it should stand in any Need of: So far from this, that all other Power is derived from Him, and is absolutely dependent on Him. (2.) That He has supreme Authority; absolute and most perfect Right to do what He wills, without Subjection to any superiour Authority, or any Derivation of Authority from any other, or Limitation by any distinct independent Authority, either superiour, equal, or inferiour; he being the Head of all Dominion, and Fountain of all Authority; and also without Restraint by any Obligation, implying either Subjection, Derivation, or Dependance, or proper Limitation. (3.)
- †It might have been objected with much more Plausibleness, that the supreme Cause cannot be free, because he must needs do always what is best in the Whole. But this would not at all serve Spinoza's Purpose: For this is a Necessity, not of Nature and Fate, but of Fitness and Wisdom; a Necessity consistent with the greatest Freedom, and most perfect Choice. For the only Foundation of this Necessity is such an unalterable Rectitude of Will, and Perfection of Wisdom, as makes it impossible for a wise Being to act foolishly. Clark's Dom. of the Being "and Attrib. of God. Edit. 6. P. 64. Tho' God is a most perfectly free Agent, yet he cannot but do always what is best and wisest in the Whole. The Reason is evident▪ because perfect Wisdom and Goodness are as steady and certain Principles of Action, as Necessity itself; and as infinitely wise and good Being, indeed with the most perfect Liberty, can no more choose to act in Contradiction to Wisdom and Goodness, than a necessary Agent can act contrary to the Necessity by which it is acted; it being as great an Absurdity and impossibility in Choice, for infinite Wisdom to choose to act unwisely, or infinite Goodness to choose what is not good, as it would be in Nature, for absolute Necessity to fail of producing its necessary Effect. There was indeed no Necessity i• Nature, that God ••ould at first create such Beings as he has created, or indeed any Being at all; because he is in himself infinitely happy and All-sufficient. There was also no Necessity in Nature, that he should preserve and continue Things in Being, after they were created; because he would be self-sufficient without their Continuance, as he was before their Creation. But it was •it and wise and good, that infinite Wisdom should manifest, and infinite Goodness communicate itself; and therefore it was necessary, in the Sense of Necessity I am now speaking of, that Things should be made at such a Time, and continued so long, and indeed with various Perfections in such Degrees, as infinite Wisdom and Goodness saw it wisest and best that they should. ••id ▪ P. 112, 113. 'Tis not a Fault, but a Perfection of our Nature, to desire, will and act, according to the last Result of a fair Examination.—This is so far from being a Restraint or Diminution of Freedom, that it is the very Improvement and Benefit of it: 'Tis not an Abridgement, 'tis the End and Use of our Liberty; and the further we are removed from such a Determination, the nearer we are to Misery and Slavery. A perfect Indifference i• the Mind, not determinable by its last Judgment of the Good or Evil that is thought to attend its Choice, would be so far from being an Advantage and Excellency of any intellectual Nature, that it would be as great as Imperfection as the Want of Indifferency to act, or not to act, till determined by the Will, would be an Imperfection on the other Side.— 'Tis as much a Perfection, that Dire or the Power of preferring should be determined by Good, as that the Power of acting should be determined by the Will: And the certainer such Determination is, the greater the Perfection. Nay, were we determined by ny Thing but the last Result of our own Minds, judging of the Good or Evil of any Action, e were not free. The very End of our Freedom being, that we might attain the Good we choose; and therefore every Man is bro't under a Necessity by his Constitution, as an intelligent Being, to be determin'd in willing by his own Thought and Judgment, what is best for him to do; else he would be under the Determination of some other than himself, which is Want of Liberty. And to deny that a Man's Will, in every Determination, follows his own Judgment, is to say, that a Man wills and acts for an End that he would not have, at the same Time that he wills and acts for it. For if he prefers it in his present Thoughts, before any other, 'tis plain he then thinks better of it, and would have it before any other; unless he can have, and not have it; will, and not will it, at the same Time; a Contradiction too manifest to be admitted.— If we look upon those superior Beings above us, who enjoy perfect Happiness, we shall have Reason to judge, that they are more steadily determined in their Choice of Good than we; and yet we have no Reason to think they are less happy, or less free, than we are. And if it were fit for such poor nite Creatures as we are, to pronounce what infinite Wisdom and Goodness could do, I think we might say, that God himself cannot choose what is not Good. The Freedom of the Almighty hinders not his being determined by what is best.— But to give a right View of this mistakes Part of Liberty, let me ask, Would any one be a Changeling, because he is less determined by wise Determinations, than a wise Man? Is it worth the Name of Freedom, to be at Liberty to play the Fool, and draw Shame and Misery upon a Man's self? If to break loose from the Conduct of Reason, and to want that Restraint of Examination and Judgment, that keeps us from doing or choosing the worse, be Liberty, true Liberty, Mad-men and Fools are the only free Men. Yet I think no Body would choose to be mad, for the sake of such Liberty, but he that is mad already. Locke, Hum. Und. Vol. 1. Edit. 7. P. 215, 216. This ing having all Things always necessarily in View, must always, and eternally will according to his infinite Comprehension of Things; that is, must will all Things that are wisest and best to be done. There is no getting free of this Consequence. If it can will at all, it must will this Way. To be capable of knowing, and not capable of willing, is not to be understood. And to be capable of willing otherwise than what is wisest and best, contradicts that Knowledge which is infinite. Infinite Knowledge must direct the Will without Error Here then is the Origin of moral Necessity; and that is really, of Freedom.— Perhaps it may be said, when the divine Will is determined, from the Consideration of the eternal Aptitudes of Things, it is as necessarily determined, as if it were physically impel'd, if that were possible. But it is Unskilfulness, to suppose this an Objection. The great Principle is once established, viz. That the divine Will is determined by the eternal Reason and Aptitudes of Things, instead of being physically impelled; and after that, the more strong and necessary this Determination is, the more perfect the Deity must be allowed to be: It is this that makes him an amiable and adorable Being, whose Will and Power are constantly, immutably determined, by the Consideration of what is wisest and best; instead of a surd Being, with Power, but without Discerning and Reason. It is the Beauty of this Necessity, that it is strong as Fate itself, with all the Advantage of Reason and Goodness.— It is strange, to see Men contend, that the Deity is not Free, because he is necessarily rational, immutably good and wise; when a Man is allowed still the perfecter Being, the more fixedly and constantly his Will is determined by Reason and Truth. Enq into the "Nature of the Hum. Soul. Edit. 3. Vol. II, P. 403, 404.
