A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, virtue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, vertue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]
Jonathan Edwards 1703–1758printed by S. Kneeland, 1754
[2], vi, [4], 294, [14] p. ; 20 cm. (8vo) · 127k words · Evans 7187
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
We find a great Deal of Difficulty in conceiving exactly of the Nature of our own Souls. And notwithstanding all the Progress which has been made in past and present Ages, in this Kind of Knowledge, whereby our Metaphysics, as it relates to these Things, is brought to greater Perfection than once it was; yet here is still Work enough left for future Enquiries and Researches, and Room for Progress still to be made, for many Ages and Generations. But we had need to be infinitely able Metaphysicians, to conceive with Clearness, according to strict, proper and perfect Truth, concerning the Nature of the divine Essence, and the Modes of the Action and Operation of the Powers of the divine Mind.
We find a great Deal of Difficulty in conceiving exactly of the Nature of our own Souls. And notwithstanding all the Progress which has been made in past and present Ages, in this Kind of Knowledge, whereby our Metaphysicks, as it relates to these Things, is brought to greater Perfection than once it was; yet here is still Work enough left for future Enquiries and Researches, and Room for Progress still to be made, for many Ages and Generations. But we had need to be infinitely able Metaphysicians, to conceive with Clearness, according to strict, proper and perfect Truth, concerning the Nature of the divine Essence, and the Modes of the Action and Operation of the Powers of the divine Mind.
And it may be noted particularly, that tho' we are obliged to conceive of some Things in God as consequent and dependent on others, and of some Things pertaining to the divine Nature and Will as the Foundation of others, and so before others in the Order of Nature: As, we must conceive of the Knowledge and Holiness of God as prior in the Order of Nature to his Happiness; the Perfection of his Understanding, as the Foundation of his wise Purposes and Decrees; the Holiness of his Nature, as the Cause and Reason of his holy Determinations. And yet when we speak of Cause and Effect, Antecedent and Consequent, fundamental and dependent, determining and determined, in the first Being, who is self-existent, independent, of perfect and absolute Simplicity and Immutability, and the first Cause of all Things; doubtless there must be less Propriety in such Representations, than when
Having premised this, I proceed to observe concerning the forementioned Author's Exclamation, about the necessary Determination of God's Will, in all Things, by what He sees to be fittest and best.
Having premised this, I proceed to observe concerning the foremention'd Author's Exclamation, about the necessary Determination of God's Will, in all Things, by what He sees to be fittest and best.
That all the seeming Force of such Objections and Exclamations must arise from an Imagination, that there is some Sort of Privilege or Dignity in being without such a moral Necessity, as will make it impossible to do any other, than always choose what is wisest and best; as tho' there were some Disadvantage, Meanness and Subjection, in such a Necessity; a Thing by which the Will was confined, kept under, and held in Servitude by something, which, as it were, maintained a strong and invincible Power and Dominion over it, by Bonds that held him fast, and that he could by no Means deliver himself from. Whereas, this must be all mere Imagination and Delusion. 'Tis no Disadvantage or Dishonour to a Being, necessarily to act in the most excellent and happy Manner, from the necessary Perfection of his own Nature. This argues no Imperfection, Inferiority or Dependence, nor any Want of Dignity, Privilege or Ascendancy. †'Tis not inconsistent with ⟨p. 233⟩the absolute, and most perfect Sovereignty of God. The Sovereignty of God is his Ability and Authority to do whatever pleases Him; whereby He doth according to his Will in the Armies of Heaven, and amongst the Inhabitants of the Earth, and none can stay his Hand, or say unto him, What dost thou?—The following Things belong to the Sovereignty of God; viz. (1.) Supreme, universal, and infinite Power; whereby he is able to do what he pleases, without Control; without any Confinement of that Power, without any Subjection in the least Measure to any other Power; and so without any Hindrance or Restraint, that it should be either impossible, or at all difficult, for him to accomplish his Will; and without any ⟨p. 234⟩Dependence of his Power on any other Power, from whence it should be derived, or which it should stand in any Need of: So far from this, that all other Power is derived from Him, and is absolutely dependent on Him. (2.) That He has supreme Authority; absolute and most perfect Right to do what He wills, without Subjection to any superior Authority, or any Derivation of Authority from any other, or Limitation by any distinct independent Authority, either superior, equal, or inferior; he being the Head of all Dominion, and Fountain of all Authority; and also without Restraint by any Obligation, implying either Subjection, Derivation, or Dependence, or proper Limitation. (3.)
That all the seeming Force of such Objections and Exclamations must arise from an Imagination, that there is some Sort of Privilege or Dignity in being without such a moral Necessity, as will make it impossible to do any other, than always chuse what is wisest and best; as tho' there were some Disadvantage, Meanness and Subjection, in such a Necessity; a Thing by which the Will was confined, kept under, and held in Servitude by something, which, as it were, maintained a strong and invincible Power and Dominion over it, by Bonds that held him fast, and that he could by no Means deliver himself from. Whereas, this must be all meer Imagination and Delusion. 'Tis no Disadvantage or Dishonour to a Being, necessarily to act in the most excellent and happy Manner, from the necessary Perfection of his own Nature. This argues no Imperfection, Inferiority or Dependance, nor any Want of Dignity, Privilege or Ascendancy. †'Tis not inconsistent with ⟨p. 233⟩the absolute, and most perfect Sovereignty of God. The Sovereignty of God is his Ability and Authority to do whatever pleases Him; whereby He doth according to his Will in the Armies of Heaven, and amongst the Inhabitants of the Earth, and none can stay his Hand, or say unto him, What dost thou?—The following Things belong to the Sovereignty of God; viz. (1.) Supreme, universal, and infinite Power; whereby he is able to do what he pleases, without Controul; without any Confinement of that Power, without any Subjection in the least Measure to any other Power; and so without any Hindrance or Restraint, that it should be either impossible, or at all difficult, for him to accomplish his Will; and without any ⟨p. 234⟩Dependance of his Power on any other Power, from whence it should be derived, or which it should stand in any Need of: So far from this, that all other Power is derived from Him, and is absolutely dependent on Him. (2.) That He has supreme Authority; absolute and most perfect Right to do what He wills, without Subjection to any superiour Authority, or any Derivation of Authority from any other, or Limitation by any distinct independent Authority, either superiour, equal, or inferiour; he being the Head of all Dominion, and Fountain of all Authority; and also without Restraint by any Obligation, implying either Subjection, Derivation, or Dependance, or proper Limitation. (3.)
†It might have been objected with much more Plausibleness, that the supreme Cause cannot be free, because he must needs do always what is best in the Whole. But this would not at all serve Spinoza's Purpose: For this is a Necessity, not of Nature and Fate, but of Fitness and Wisdom; a Necessity consistent with the greatest Freedom, and most perfect Choice. For the only Foundation of this Necessity is such an unalterable Rectitude of Will, and Perfection of Wisdom, as makes it impossible for a wise Being to act foolishly. Clark's Dom. of the Being "and Attrib. of God. Edit. 6. P. 64. Tho' God is a most perfectly free Agent, yet he cannot but do always what is best and wisest in the Whole. The Reason is evident▪ because perfect Wisdom and Goodness are as steady and certain Principles of Action, as Necessity itself; and as infinitely wise and good Being, indeed with the most perfect Liberty, can no more choose to act in Contradiction to Wisdom and Goodness, than a necessary Agent can act contrary to the Necessity by which it is acted; it being as great an Absurdity and impossibility in Choice, for infinite Wisdom to choose to act unwisely, or infinite Goodness to choose what is not good, as it would be in Nature, for absolute Necessity to fail of producing its necessary Effect. There was indeed no Necessity i• Nature, that God ••ould at first create such Beings as he has created, or indeed any Being at all; because he is in himself infinitely happy and All-sufficient. There was also no Necessity in Nature, that he should preserve and continue Things in Being, after they were created; because he would be self-sufficient without their Continuance, as he was before their Creation. But it was •it and wise and good, that infinite Wisdom should manifest, and infinite Goodness communicate itself; and therefore it was necessary, in the Sense of Necessity I am now speaking of, that Things should be made at such a Time, and continued so long, and indeed with various Perfections in such Degrees, as infinite Wisdom and Goodness saw it wisest and best that they should. ••id ▪ P. 112, 113. 'Tis not a Fault, but a Perfection of our Nature, to desire, will and act, according to the last Result of a fair Examination.—This is so far from being a Restraint or Diminution of Freedom, that it is the very Improvement and Benefit of it: 'Tis not an Abridgement, 'tis the End and Use of our Liberty; and the further we are removed from such a Determination, the nearer we are to Misery and Slavery. A perfect Indifference i• the Mind, not determinable by its last Judgment of the Good or Evil that is thought to attend its Choice, would be so far from being an Advantage and Excellency of any intellectual Nature, that it would be as great as Imperfection as the Want of Indifferency to act, or not to act, till determined by the Will, would be an Imperfection on the other Side.— 'Tis as much a Perfection, that Dire or the Power of preferring should be determined by Good, as that the Power of acting should be determined by the Will: And the certainer such Determination is, the greater the Perfection. Nay, were we determined by ny Thing but the last Result of our own Minds, judging of the Good or Evil of any Action, e were not free. The very End of our Freedom being, that we might attain the Good we choose; and therefore every Man is bro't under a Necessity by his Constitution, as an intelligent Being, to be determin'd in willing by his own Thought and Judgment, what is best for him to do; else he would be under the Determination of some other than himself, which is Want of Liberty. And to deny that a Man's Will, in every Determination, follows his own Judgment, is to say, that a Man wills and acts for an End that he would not have, at the same Time that he wills and acts for it. For if he prefers it in his present Thoughts, before any other, 'tis plain he then thinks better of it, and would have it before any other; unless he can have, and not have it; will, and not will it, at the same Time; a Contradiction too manifest to be admitted.— If we look upon those superior Beings above us, who enjoy perfect Happiness, we shall have Reason to judge, that they are more steadily determined in their Choice of Good than we; and yet we have no Reason to think they are less happy, or less free, than we are. And if it were fit for such poor nite Creatures as we are, to pronounce what infinite Wisdom and Goodness could do, I think we might say, that God himself cannot choose what is not Good. The Freedom of the Almighty hinders not his being determined by what is best.— But to give a right View of this mistakes Part of Liberty, let me ask, Would any one be a Changeling, because he is less determined by wise Determinations, than a wise Man? Is it worth the Name of Freedom, to be at Liberty to play the Fool, and draw Shame and Misery upon a Man's self? If to break loose from the Conduct of Reason, and to want that Restraint of Examination and Judgment, that keeps us from doing or choosing the worse, be Liberty, true Liberty, Mad-men and Fools are the only free Men. Yet I think no Body would choose to be mad, for the sake of such Liberty, but he that is mad already. Locke, Hum. Und. Vol. 1. Edit. 7. P. 215, 216. This ing having all Things always necessarily in View, must always, and eternally will according to his infinite Comprehension of Things; that is, must will all Things that are wisest and best to be done. There is no getting free of this Consequence. If it can will at all, it must will this Way. To be capable of knowing, and not capable of willing, is not to be understood. And to be capable of willing otherwise than what is wisest and best, contradicts that Knowledge which is infinite. Infinite Knowledge must direct the Will without Error Here then is the Origin of moral Necessity; and that is really, of Freedom.— Perhaps it may be said, when the divine Will is determined, from the Consideration of the eternal Aptitudes of Things, it is as necessarily determined, as if it were physically impel'd, if that were possible. But it is Unskilfulness, to suppose this an Objection. The great Principle is once established, viz. That the divine Will is determined by the eternal Reason and Aptitudes of Things, instead of being physically impelled; and after that, the more strong and necessary this Determination is, the more perfect the Deity must be allowed to be: It is this that makes him an amiable and adorable Being, whose Will and Power are constantly, immutably determined, by the Consideration of what is wisest and best; instead of a surd Being, with Power, but without Discerning and Reason. It is the Beauty of this Necessity, that it is strong as Fate itself, with all the Advantage of Reason and Goodness.— It is strange, to see Men contend, that the Deity is not Free, because he is necessarily rational, immutably good and wise; when a Man is allowed still the perfecter Being, the more fixedly and constantly his Will is determined by Reason and Truth. Enq into the "Nature of the Hum. Soul. Edit. 3. Vol. II, P. 403, 404.
That his Will is supreme, underived, and independent on any Thing without Himself; being ⟨p. 235⟩in every Thing determined by his own Counsel, having no other Rule but his own Wisdom; his Will not being subject to, or restrained by the Will of any other, and others Wills being perfectly subject to his. (4.) That his Wisdom, which determines his Will, is supreme, perfect, underived, self-sufficient, and independent; so that it may be said as in Isai. xl.14. With whom took He Counsel? And who instructed Him and taught Him in the Path of Judgment, and taught Him Knowledge, and showed Him the Way of Understanding?—There is no other divine Sovereignty but this: and this is properly absolute Sovereignty: No other is desirable; nor would any other be honourable, or happy: and indeed there is no other conceivable or possible. 'Tis the Glory and Greatness of the divine Sovereignty, that God's Will is determined by his own infinite all-sufficient Wisdom in every Thing; and in nothing at all is either directed by any inferior Wisdom, or by no Wisdom; whereby it would become senseless Arbitrariness, determining and acting without Reason, Design or End.
That his Will is supreme, underived, and independent on any Thing without Himself; being ⟨p. 235⟩in every Thing determin'd by his own Counsel, having no other Rule but his own Wisdom; his Will not being subject to, or restrain'd by the Will of any other, and others Wills being perfectly subject to his. (4.) That his Wisdom, which determines his Will, is supreme, perfect, underived, self-sufficient, and independent; so that it may be said as in Isai. xl.14. With whom took He Counsel? And who instructed Him and taught Him in the Path of Iudgment, and taught Him Knowlege, and shewed Him the Way of Understanding?—There is no other divine Sovereignty but this: and this is properly absolute Sovereignty: No other is desirable; nor would any other be honourable, or happy: and indeed there is no other conceivable or possible. 'Tis the Glory and Greatness of the divine Sovereignty, that God's Will is determin'd by his own infinite all-sufficient Wisdom in every Thing; and in nothing at all is either directed by any inferiour Wisdom, or by no Wisdom; whereby it would become senseless Arbitrariness, determining and acting without Reason, Design or End.
If God's Will is steadily and surely determined in every Thing by supreme Wisdom, then it is in every Thing necessarily determined to that which is most wise. And certainly it would be a Disadvantage and Indignity, to be otherwise. For if the divine Will was not necessarily determined to that which in every Case is wisest and best, it must be subject to some Degree of undesigning Contingence; and so in the same Degree liable to Evil. To suppose the divine Will liable to be carried hither and thither at Random, by the uncertain Wind of blind Contingence, which is guided by no Wisdom, no Motive, no intelligent Dictate whatsoever, (if any such Thing were possible) would certainly argue a great Degree of Imperfection and Meanness, infinitely unworthy of the Deity.—If it be a Disadvantage, for the divine Will to be attended with this moral Necessity, then the more free from it, and the more left at Random, the greater Dignity and Advantage. And consequently to be perfectly free from the Direction of Understanding, and universally and entirely left to senseless unmeaning Contingence, to act absolutely at Random, would be the supreme Glory.
If God's Will is stead•ly and surely determined in every Thing by supreme Wisdom, then it is in every Thing necessarily determined to that which is most wise. And certainly it would be a Disadvantage and Indignity, to be otherwise. For if the divine Will was not necessarily determin'd to that which in every Case is wisest and best, it must be subject to some Degree of undesigning Contingence; and so in the same Degree liable to Evil. To suppose the divine Will liable to be carried hither and thither at Random, by the uncertain Wind of blind Contingence, which is guided by no Wisdom, no Motive, no intelligent Dictate whatsoever, (if any such Thing were possible) would certainly argue a great Degree of Imperfection and Meanness, infinitely unworthy of the Deity.—If it be a Disadvantage, for the divine Will to be attended with this moral Necessity, then the more free from it, and the more left at Random, the greater Dignity and Advantage. And consequently to be perfectly free from the Direction of Understanding, and universally and entirely left to senseless unmeaning Contingence, to act absolutely at Random, would be the supreme Glory.
It no more argues any Dependence of God's Will, that his supremely wise Volition is necessary, than it argues a Dependence of his Being, that his Existence is necessary. If it be something too low, for the supreme Being to have his Will determined by moral Necessity, so as necessarily, in every Case, to will in the highest Degree holily and happily; then why is it not also something too low, for him to have his Existence, and the infinite Perfection of his Nature, and his infinite Happiness determined by Necessity? It is no more to God's Dishonour, to be necessarily wise, than to be necessarily holy. And if neither of them be to his Dishonour, then it is not to his Dishonour necessarily to act holily and wisely. And if it be not dishonourable, to be necessarily holy and wise, in the highest possible Degree, no more is it mean or dishonourable, necessarily to act holily and wisely in the highest possible Degree; or (which is the same Thing) to do that, in every Case, which above all other Things is wisest and best.
The Reason why it is not dishonourable, to be necessarily most holy, is, because Holiness in itself is an excellent and honourable Thing. For the same Reason, it is no Dishonour to be necessarily most wise, and in every Case to act most wisely, or do th• Thing which is the wisest of all; for Wisdom is also in it self excellent and honourable.
The forementioned Author of the Essay on the Freedom of Will &c. as has been observed, represents that Doctrine of the divine Will's being in every Thing necessarily determined by superior Fitness, as making the blessed God a Kind of almighty Minister and mechanical Medium of Fate: And he insists, P. 93, 94. that this moral Necessity and Impossibility is in Effect the same Thing with physical and natural Necessity and Impossibility: And in P. 54, 55. he says, The Scheme which determines the Will always and certainly by the Understanding, and the Understanding by the Appearance of Things, seems to take away the true Nature of Vice and Virtue. For the sublimest of Virtues, and the vilest of Vices, seem rather to be Matters of Fate and Necessity, flowing naturally and necessarily from the Existence, the Circumstances, and present Situation of Persons and Things: For this Existence and Situation necessarily makes such an Appearance to the Mind; from this Appearance flows a necessary Perception and Judgment, concerning these Things; this Judgment necessarily determines the Will: And thus by this Chain of necessary Causes, Virtue and Vice would lose their Nature, and become natural Ideas, and necessary Things, instead of moral and free Actions.
The forementioned Author of the Essay on the Freedom of Will &c. as has been observed, represents that Doctrine of the divine Will's being in every Thing necessarily determined by superior Fitness, as making the blessed God a Kind of almighty Minister and mechanical Medium of Fate: And he insists, P. 93, 94. that this moral Necessity and Impossibility is in Effect the same Thing with physical and natural Necessity and Impossibility: And in P. 54, 55. he says, The Scheme which dete•mines the Will always and certainly by the Understanding, and the Understanding by the Appearance of Things, seems to take away the true Nature of Vice and Vertue. For the sublimest of Vertues, and the vilest of Vices, seem rather to be Matters of Fate and Necessity, flowing naturally and necessarily from the Existence, the Circumstances, and present Situation of Persons and Things: For this Existence and Situation necessarily makes such an Appearance to the Mind; from this Appearance flows a necessary Perception and Judgment, concerning these Things; this Judgment necessarily determines the Will: And thus by this Chain of necessary Causes, Vertue and Vice would lose their Nature, and become natural Ideas, and necessary Things, instead of moral and free Actions.
And yet this same Author allows, P. 30, 31. That a perfectly wise Being will constantly and certainly choose what is most fit; and says, P. 102, 103. I grant, and always have granted, that wheresoever there is such an antecedent superior Fitness of Things, God acts according to it, so as never to contradict it; and particularly, in all his judicial Proceedings, as a Governor, and Distributer of Rewards and Punishments. Yea, he says expressly, P. 42. That it is not possible for God to act otherwise, than according to this Fitness and Goodness in Things.
And yet this same Author allows, P. 30, 31. That a perfectly wise Being will constantly and certainly chuse what is most fit; and says, P. 102, 103. I grant, and always have granted, that wheresoever there is such an antecedent superior Fitness of Things, God acts according to it, so as never to contradict it; and particularly, in all his judicial Proceedings, as a Governor, and Distributer of Rewards and Punishments. Yea, he says expresly, P. 42. That it is not possible for God to act otherwise, than according to this Fitness and Goodness in Things.
So that according to this Author, putting these several Passages of his Essay together, there is no Virtue, nor any Thing of a moral Nature, in the most sublime and glorious Acts and Exercises of God's Holiness, Justice, and Faithfulness; and He never does any Thing which is in it self supremely worthy, and above all other Things fit and excellent, but only as a Kind of mechanical Medium of Fate; and in what he does as the Judge, and moral Governor of the World, He exercises no moral Excellency; exercising no Freedom in these Things, because He acts by moral Necessity, which is in Effect the same with physical or ⟨p. 238⟩natural Necessity; and therefore he only acts by an Hobbistical Fatality▪ as a Being indeed of vast Understanding, as well as Power and Efficiency (as He said before) but without a Will to choose, being a Kind of almighty Minister of Fate, acting under it's supreme Influence. For He allows, that in all these Things God's Will is determined constantly and certainly by a superior Fitness, and that it is not possible for Him to act otherwise. And if these Things are so, what Glory or Praise belongs to God for doing holily and justly, or taking the most fit, holy, wise and excellent Course, in any one Instance? Whereas, according to the Scriptures, and also the common Sense of Mankind, it don't in the least derogate from the Honour of any Being, that through the moral Perfection of his Nature, he necessarily acts with supreme Wisdom and Holiness: But on the contrary, his Praise is the greater: Herein consists the Height of his Glory.
So that according to this Author, putting these several Passages of his Essay together, there is no Vertue, nor any Thing of a moral Nature, in the most sublime and glorious Acts and Exercises of God's Holiness, Justice, and Faithfulness; and He never does any Thing which is in it self supreamly worthy, and above all other Things fit and excellent, but only as a Kind of mechanical Medium of Fate; and in what he does as the Iudge, and moral Governor of the World, He exercises no moral Excellency; exercising no Freedom in these Things, because He acts by moral Necessity, which is in Effect the same with physical or ⟨p. 238⟩natural Necessity; and therefore he only acts by an Hobbistical Fatality▪ as a Being indeed of vast Understanding, as well as Power and Efficiency (as He said before) but without a Will to chuse, being a Kind of almighty Minister of Fate, acting under it's supream Influence. For He allows, that in all these Things God's Will is determined constantly and certainly by a superiour Fitness, and that it is not possible for Him to act otherwise. And if these Things are so, what Glory or Praise belongs to God for doing holily and justly, or taking the most fit, holy, wise and excellent Course, in any one Instance? Whereas, according to the Scriptures, and also the common Sense of Mankind, it don't in the least derogate from the Honour of any Being, that through the moral Perfection of his Nature, he necessarily acts with supream Wisdom and Holiness: But on the contrary, his Praise is the greater: Herein consists the Height of his Glory.
The same Author, P. 56. supposes, that herein appears the excellent Character of a wise and good Man, that tho' he can choose contrary to the Fitness of Things, yet he does not; but suffers himself to be directed by Fitness; and that in this Conduct He imitates the blessed God. And yet He supposes 'tis contrariwise with the blessed God; not that he suffers Himself to be directed by Fitness, when He can choose contrary to the Fitness of Things, but that he cannot choose contrary to the Fitness of Things; as he says, P. 42. —That it is not possible for God to act otherwise, than, according to this Fitness, where there is any Fitness or Goodness in Things: Yea, he supposes, P. 31. That if a Man were perfectly wise and good, he could not do otherwise than be constantly and certainly determined by the Fitness of Things.
The same Author, P. 56. supposes, that herein appears the excellent Character of a wise and good Man, that tho' he can chuse contrary to the Fitness of Things, yet he does not; but suffers himself to be directed by Fitness; and that in this Conduct He imitates the blessed God. And yet He supposes 'tis contrariwise with the blessed God; not that he suffers Himself to be directed by Fitness, when He can chuse contrary to the Fitness of Things, but that he cannot chuse contrary to the Fitness of Things; as he says, P. 42. —That it is not possible for God to act otherwise, than, according to this Fitness, where there is any Fitness or Goodness in Things: Yea, he supposes, P. 31. That if a Man were perfectly wise and good, he could not do otherwise than be constantly and certainly determined by the Fitness of Things.
One Thing more I would observe, before I conclude this Section; and that is, that if it derogates nothing from the Glory of God, to be necessarily determined by superior Fitness in some Things, then neither does it to be thus determined in all Things; from any Thing in the Nature of such Necessity, as at all detracting from God's Freedom, Independence, absolute Supremacy, or any Dignity or Glory of his Nature, State, or Manner of acting; or as implying any Infirmity, Restraint, or Subjection. And if the Thing be such as well consists with God's Glory, and has nothing tending at all to detract from it; then we need not be afraid of ascribing it to God in too many Things, lest thereby we should detract from God's Glory too much.
One Thing more I would observe, before I conclude this Section; and that is, that if it derogates nothing from the Glory of God, to be necessarily determined by superior Fitness in some Things, then neither does it to be thus determined in all Things; from any Thing in the Nature of such Necessity, as at all detracting from God's Freedom, Independence, absolute Supr•macy, or any Dignity or Glory of his Nature, State, or Manner of acting; or as implying any Infirmity, Restraint, or Subjection. And if the Thing be such as well consists with God's Glory, and has nothing tending at all to detract from it; then we need not be afraid of ascribing it to God in too many Things, lest thereby we should detract from God's Glory too much.
THE Author last cited, as has been observed, owns that God, being perfectly wise, will constantly and certainly choose what appears most fit, where there is a superior Fitness and Goodness in Things; and that it is not possible for him to do otherwise. So that it is in Effect confessed, that in those Things where there is any real Preferableness, 'tis no Dishonour, nothing in any Respect unworthy of God, for him to act from Necessity; notwithstanding all that can be objected from the Agreement of such a Necessity, with the Fate of the Stoics, and the Necessity maintained by Mr. Hobbes. From which it will follow, that if it were so, that in all the different Things, among which God chooses, there were evermore a superior Fitness or Preferableness on one Side, then it would be no Dishonour, or any Thing, in any Respect, unworthy, or unbecoming of God, for his Will to be necessarily determined in every Thing. And if this be allowed, it is a giving up entirely the Argument, from the Unsuitableness of such a Necessity to the Liberty, Supremacy, Independence and Glory of the divine Being; and a resting the whole Weight of the Affair on the Decision of another Point wholly diverse; viz. Whether it be so indeed, that in all the various possible Things which are in God's View, and may be considered as capable Objects of his Choice, there is not evermore a Preferableness in one Thing above another. This is denied by this Author; who supposes, that in many Instances, between two or more possible Things, which come within the View of the divine Mind, there is a perfect Indifference and Equality as to Fitness, or Tendency to attain any good End which God can have in View, or to answer any of his Designs. Now therefore I would consider whether this be evident.
THE Author last cited, as has been observed, owns that God, being perfectly wise, will constantly and certainly chuse what appears most fit, where there is a superior Fitness and Goodness in Things; and that it is not possible for him to do otherwise. So that it is in Effect confess'd, that in those Things where there is any real Preferableness, 'tis no Dishonour, nothing in any Respect unworthy of God, for him to act from Necessity; notwithstanding all that can be objected from the Agreement of such a Necessity, with the Fate of the Stoicks, and the Necessity maintain'd by Mr. Hobbes. From which it will follow, that if it were so, that in all the different Things, among which God chuses, there were evermore a superior Fitness or Preferableness on one Side, then it would be no Dishonour, or any Thing, in any Respect, unworthy, or unbecoming of God, for his Will to be necessarily determined in every Thing. And if this be allowed, it is a giving up entirely the Argument, from the Unsuitableness of such a Necessity to the Liberty, Supremacy, Independence and Glory of the divine Being; and a resting the whole Weight of the Affair on the Decision of another Point wholly diverse; viz. Whether it be so indeed, that in all the various possible Things which are in God's View, and may be considered as capable Objects of his Choice, there is not evermore a Preferableness in one Thing above another. This is denied by this Author; who supposes, that in many Instances, between two or more possible Things, which come within the View of the divine Mind, there is a perfect Indifference and Equality as to Fitness, or Tendency to attain any good End which God can have in View, or to answer any of his Designs. Now therefore I would consider whether this be evident.
The Arguments brought to prove this, are of two Kinds. (1.) It is urged, that in many Instances we must suppose there is absolutely no Difference between various possible Objects of Choice, which God has in View: And (2.) that the ⟨p. 240⟩Difference between many Things is so inconsiderable, or of such a Nature, that it would be unreasonable to suppose it to be of any Consequence; or to suppose that any of God's wise Designs would not be answered in one Way as well as the other.
New England
Minister at Northampton; theologian of the Great Awakening.
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It might have been objected with much more Plausibleness, that the supreme Cause cannot be free, because he must needs do always what is best in the Whole. But this would not at all serve Spinoza's Purpose: For this is a Necessity, not of Nature and Fate, but of Fitness and Wisdom; a Necessity consistent with the greatest Freedom, and most perfect Choice. For the only Foundation of this Necessity is such an unalterable Rectitude of Will, and Perfection of Wisdom, as makes it impossible for a wise Being to act foolishly. Clark's Dom. of the Being "and Attrib. of God. Edit. 6. P. 64. Tho' God is a most perfectly free Agent, yet he cannot but do always what is best and wisest in the Whole. The Reason is evident▪ because perfect Wisdom and Goodness are as steady and certain Principles of Action, as Necessity itself; and as infinitely wise and good Being, indeed with the most perfect Liberty, can no more chuse to act in Contradiction to Wisdom and Goodness, than a necessary Agent can act contrary to the Necessity by which it is acted; it being as great an Absurdity and impossibility in Choice, for infinite Wisdom to chuse to act unwisely, or infinite Goodness to chuse what is not good, as it would be in Nature, for absolute Necessity to fail of producing its necessary Effect. There was indeed no Necessity i• Nature, that God ••ould at first create such Beings as he has created, or indeed any Being at all; because he is in himself infinitely happy and All-sufficient. There was also no Necessity in Nature, that he should preserve and continue Things in Being, after they were created; because he would be self-sufficient without their Continuance, as he was before their Creation. But it was •it and wise and good, that infinite Wisdom should manifest, and infinite Goodness communicate itself; and therefore it was necessary, in the Sense of Necessity I am now speaking of, that Things should be made at such a Time, and continued so long, and indeed with various Perfections in such Degrees, as infinite Wisdom and Goodness saw it wisest and best that they should. ••id ▪ P. 112, 113. 'Tis not a Fault, but a Perfection of our Nature, to desire, will and act, according to the last Result of a fair Examination.—This is so far from being a Restraint or Diminution of Freedom, that it is the very Improvement and Benefit of it: 'Tis not an Abridgment, 'tis the End and Use of our Liberty; and the further we are removed from such a Determination, the nearer we are to Misery and Slavery. A perfect Indifference i• the Mind, not determinable by its last Judgment of the Good or Evil that is thought to attend its Choice, would be so far from being an Advan••ge and Excellency of any intellectual Nature, that it would be as great as Imperfection▪ as the Want of Indifferency to act, or not to act, till determined by the Will, would be an Imperfection on the other Side.— 'Tis as much a Perfection, that D••ire or the Power of preferring should be determined by Good, as that the Power of acting should be determined by the Will: And the certainer such Determination is, the greater the Perfection. Nay, were we determined by •ny Thing but the last Result of our own Minds, judging of the Good or Evil of any Action, •e were not free. The very End of our Freedom being, that we might attain the Good we chuse; and therefore every Man is bro't under a Necessity by his Constitution, as an intelligent Being, to be determin'd in willing by his own Thought and Judgment, what is best for him to do; else he would be under the Determination of some other than himself, which is Want of Liberty. And to deny that a Man's Will, in every Determination, follows his own Judgment, is to say, that a Man wills and acts for an End that he would not have, at the same Time that he wills and acts for it. For if he prefers it in his present Thoughts, before any other, 'tis plain he then thinks better of it, and would have it before any other; unless he can have, and not have it; will, and not will it, at the same Time; a Contradiction too manifest to be admitted.— If we look upon those superior Bei•gs above us, who enjoy perfect Happiness, we shall have Reason to judge, that they are more steadily determined in their Choice of Good than we; and yet we have no Reason to think they are less happy, or less free, than we are. And if it were fit for such poor ••nite Creatures as we are, to pronounce what infinite Wisdom and Goodness could do, I think we might say, that God himself cannot chuse what is not Good. The Freedom of the Almighty hinders not his being determined by what is best.— But to give a right View of this mistakes Part of Liberty, let me ask, Would any one be a Changeling, because he is less determined by wise Determinations, than a wise Man? Is it worth the Name of Freedom, to be at Liberty to play the Fool, and draw Shame and Misery upon a Man's self? If to break loose from the Conduct of Reason, and to want that Restraint of Examination and Judgment, that keeps us from doing or chusing the worse, be Liberty, true Liberty, Mad-men and Fools are the only free Men. Yet I think no Body would chuse to be mad, for the sake of such Liberty, but he that is mad already. Locke, Hum. Und. Vol. 1. Edit. 7. P. 215, 216. This ••ing having all Things always necessarily in View, must always, and eternally will▪ according to his infinite Comprehension of Things; that is, must will all Things that are wisest and best to be done. There is no getting free of this Consequence. If it can will at all, it must will this Way. To be capable of knowing, and not capable of willing, is not to be understood. And to be capable of willing otherwise than what is wisest and best, contradicts that Knowledge which is infinite. Infinite Knowledge must direct the Will without Error Here then is the Origin of moral Necessity; and that is really, of Freedom.— Perhaps it may be said, when the divine Will is determined, from the Consideration of the eternal Aptitudes of Things, it is as necessarily determined, as if it were physically impel'd, if that were possible. But it is Unskilfulness, to suppose this an Objection. The great Principle is once established, viz. That the divine Will is determined by the eternal Reason and Aptitudes of Things, instead of being physically impelled; and after that, the more strong and necessary this Determination is, the more perfect the Deity must be allowed to be: It is this that makes him an amiable and adorable Being, whose Will and Power are constantly, immutably determined, by the Consideration of what is wisest and best; instead of a surd Being, with Power, but without Discerning and Reason. It is the Beauty of this Necessity, that it is strong as Fate itself, with all the Advantage of Reason and Goodness.— It is strange, to see Men contend, that the Deity is not Free, because he is necessarily rational, immutably good and wise; when a Man is allowed still the perfecter Being, the more fixedly and c••stantly his Will is determined by Reason and Truth. Enq•••• into the "Nature of the Hum. Soul. Edit. 3. Vol. II, P. 403, 404.
