A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…

It no more argues any Dependence of God's Will, that his supremely wise Volition is necessary, than it argues a Dependence of his Being, that his Existence is necessary. If it be something too low, for the supreme Being to have his Will determined by moral Necessity, so as necessarily, in every Case, to will in the highest Degree holily and happily; then why is it not also something too low, for him to have his Existence, and the infinite Perfection of his Nature, and his infinite Happiness determined by Necessity? It is no more to God's Dishonour, to be necessarily wise, than to be necessarily holy. And if neither of them be to his Dishonour, then it is not to his Dishonour necessarily to act holily and wisely. And if it be not dishonourable, to be necessarily holy and wise, in the highest possible Degree, no more is it mean or dishonourable, necessarily to act holily and wisely in the highest possible Degree; or (which is the same Thing) to do that, in every Case, which above all other Things is wisest and best.

The Reason why it is not dishonourable, to be necessarily most holy, is, because Holiness in itself is an excellent and honourable Thing. For the same Reason, it is no Dishonour to be necessarily most wise, and in every Case to act most wisely, or do th• Thing which is the wisest of all; for Wisdom is also in it self excellent and honourable.

The forementioned Author of the Essay on the Freedom of Will &c. as has been observed, represents that Doctrine of the divine Will's being in every Thing necessarily determined by superior Fitness, as making the blessed God a Kind of almighty Minister and mechanical Medium of Fate: And he insists, P. 93, 94. that this moral Necessity and Impossibility is in Effect the same Thing with physical and natural Necessity and Impossibility: And in P. 54, 55. he says, The Scheme which determines the Will always and certainly by the Understanding, and the Understanding by the Appearance of Things, seems to take away the true Nature of Vice and Virtue. For the sublimest of Virtues, and the vilest of Vices, seem rather to be Matters of Fate and Necessity, flowing naturally and necessarily from the Existence, the Circumstances, and present Situation of Persons and Things: For this Existence and Situation necessarily makes such an Appearance to the Mind; from this Appearance flows a necessary Perception and Judgment, concerning these Things; this Judgment necessarily determines the Will: And thus by this Chain of necessary Causes, Virtue and Vice would lose their Nature, and become natural Ideas, and necessary Things, instead of moral and free Actions.