A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…

The Reason why it is not dishonourable, to be necessarily most holy, is, because Holiness in itself is an excellent and honourable Thing. For the same Reason, it is no Dishonour to be necessarily most wise, and in every Case to act most wisely, or do th• Thing which is the wisest of all; for Wisdom is also in it self excellent and honourable.

The forementioned Author of the Essay on the Freedom of Will &c. as has been observed, represents that Doctrine of the divine Will's being in every Thing necessarily determined by superior Fitness, as making the blessed God a Kind of almighty Minister and mechanical Medium of Fate: And he insists, P. 93, 94. that this moral Necessity and Impossibility is in Effect the same Thing with physical and natural Necessity and Impossibility: And in P. 54, 55. he says, The Scheme which determines the Will always and certainly by the Understanding, and the Understanding by the Appearance of Things, seems to take away the true Nature of Vice and Virtue. For the sublimest of Virtues, and the vilest of Vices, seem rather to be Matters of Fate and Necessity, flowing naturally and necessarily from the Existence, the Circumstances, and present Situation of Persons and Things: For this Existence and Situation necessarily makes such an Appearance to the Mind; from this Appearance flows a necessary Perception and Judgment, concerning these Things; this Judgment necessarily determines the Will: And thus by this Chain of necessary Causes, Virtue and Vice would lose their Nature, and become natural Ideas, and necessary Things, instead of moral and free Actions.

The forementioned Author of the Essay on the Freedom of Will &c. as has been observed, represents that Doctrine of the divine Will's being in every Thing necessarily determined by superior Fitness, as making the blessed God a Kind of almighty Minister and mechanical Medium of Fate: And he insists, P. 93, 94. that this moral Necessity and Impossibility is in Effect the same Thing with physical and natural Necessity and Impossibility: And in P. 54, 55. he says, The Scheme which dete•mines the Will always and certainly by the Understanding, and the Understanding by the Appearance of Things, seems to take away the true Nature of Vice and Vertue. For the sublimest of Vertues, and the vilest of Vices, seem rather to be Matters of Fate and Necessity, flowing naturally and necessarily from the Existence, the Circumstances, and present Situation of Persons and Things: For this Existence and Situation necessarily makes such an Appearance to the Mind; from this Appearance flows a necessary Perception and Judgment, concerning these Things; this Judgment necessarily determines the Will: And thus by this Chain of necessary Causes, Vertue and Vice would lose their Nature, and become natural Ideas, and necessary Things, instead of moral and free Actions.