A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…

THE Author last cited, as has been observed, owns that God, being perfectly wise, will constantly and certainly choose what appears most fit, where there is a superior Fitness and Goodness in Things; and that it is not possible for him to do otherwise. So that it is in Effect confessed, that in those Things where there is any real Preferableness, 'tis no Dishonour, nothing in any Respect unworthy of God, for him to act from Necessity; notwithstanding all that can be objected from the Agreement of such a Necessity, with the Fate of the Stoics, and the Necessity maintained by Mr. Hobbes. From which it will follow, that if it were so, that in all the different Things, among which God chooses, there were evermore a superior Fitness or Preferableness on one Side, then it would be no Dishonour, or any Thing, in any Respect, unworthy, or unbecoming of God, for his Will to be necessarily determined in every Thing. And if this be allowed, it is a giving up entirely the Argument, from the Unsuitableness of such a Necessity to the Liberty, Supremacy, Independence and Glory of the divine Being; and a resting the whole Weight of the Affair on the Decision of another Point wholly diverse; viz. Whether it be so indeed, that in all the various possible Things which are in God's View, and may be considered as capable Objects of his Choice, there is not evermore a Preferableness in one Thing above another. This is denied by this Author; who supposes, that in many Instances, between two or more possible Things, which come within the View of the divine Mind, there is a perfect Indifference and Equality as to Fitness, or Tendency to attain any good End which God can have in View, or to answer any of his Designs. Now therefore I would consider whether this be evident.

THE Author last cited, as has been observed, owns that God, being perfectly wise, will constantly and certainly chuse what appears most fit, where there is a superior Fitness and Goodness in Things; and that it is not possible for him to do otherwise. So that it is in Effect confess'd, that in those Things where there is any real Preferableness, 'tis no Dishonour, nothing in any Respect unworthy of God, for him to act from Necessity; notwithstanding all that can be objected from the Agreement of such a Necessity, with the Fate of the Stoicks, and the Necessity maintain'd by Mr. Hobbes. From which it will follow, that if it were so, that in all the different Things, among which God chuses, there were evermore a superior Fitness or Preferableness on one Side, then it would be no Dishonour, or any Thing, in any Respect, unworthy, or unbecoming of God, for his Will to be necessarily determined in every Thing. And if this be allowed, it is a giving up entirely the Argument, from the Unsuitableness of such a Necessity to the Liberty, Supremacy, Independence and Glory of the divine Being; and a resting the whole Weight of the Affair on the Decision of another Point wholly diverse; viz. Whether it be so indeed, that in all the various possible Things which are in God's View, and may be considered as capable Objects of his Choice, there is not evermore a Preferableness in one Thing above another. This is denied by this Author; who supposes, that in many Instances, between two or more possible Things, which come within the View of the divine Mind, there is a perfect Indifference and Equality as to Fitness, or Tendency to attain any good End which God can have in View, or to answer any of his Designs. Now therefore I would consider whether this be evident.