A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…

Ans. (2.) But then, supposing that there are two Particles or Atoms of Matter perfectly equal and alike, which God has placed in different Parts of the Creation; as I will not deny it to be possible for God to make two Bodies perfectly alike, and put them in different Places; yet it will not follow, that two different or distinct Acts or Effects of the divine Power have exactly the same Fitness for the same Ends. For these two different Bodies are not different or distinct, in any other Respects than those wherein they differ: They are two in no other Respects than those wherein there is a Difference. If they are perfectly equal and alike in themselves, then they can be distinguished, or be distinct, only in those Things which are called Circumstances; as, Place, Time, Rest, Motion, or some other present or past Circumstances or Relations. For 'tis Difference only, that constitutes Distinction. If God makes two Bodies in themselves every Way equal and alike, and agreeing ⟨p. 244⟩perfectly in all other Circumstances and Relations, but only their Place; then in this only is there any Distinction or Duplicity. The Figure is the same, the Measure is the same, the Solidity and Resistance are the same, and every Thing the same, but only the Place. Therefore what the Will of God determines, is this, namely, that there should be the same Figure, the same Extension, the same Resistance, &c. in two different Places. And for this Determination he has some Reason. There is some End, for which such a Determination and Act has a peculiar Fitness, above all other Acts. Here is no one Thing determined without an End, and no one Thing without a Fitness for that End, superior to any Thing else. If it be the Pleasure of God to cause the same Resistance, and the same Figure, to be in two different Places and Situations, we can no more justly argue from it, that here must be some Determination or Act of God's Will, that is wholly without Motive or End, then we can argue that whenever, in any Case, it is a Man's Will to speak the same Words, or make the same Sounds at two different Times; there must be some Determination or Act of his Will, without any Motive or End. The Difference of Pl••e, in the former Case, proves no more than the Difference of Time does in the other. If any one should say with Regard to the former Case, that there must be something determined without an End; viz.