A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…

If in the Instance of the two Spheres, perfectly alike, it be supposed possible that God might have made them in a contrary Position; that which is made at the right Hand, being made at the Left; then I ask, Whether it is not evidently equally possible, if God had made but one of them, and that in the Place of the right-hand Globe, that he might have made that numerically different from what it is, and numerically different from what he did make it; tho' perfectly alike, and in the same Place; and at the same Time, and in every Respect, in the same Circumstances and Relations? Namely, Whether he might not have made it numerically the same with that which he has now made at the left Hand; and so have left that which is now created at the right Hand, in a State of Non-Existence? And if so, whether it would not have been possible to have made one in that Place, perfectly like these, and yet numerically differing from both? And let it be considered, whether from this Notion of a numerical Difference in Bodies, perfectly equal and alike, which numerical Difference is something inherent in the Bodies themselves, and diverse from the Difference of Place or Time, or any Circumstance whatsoever; it will not follow, that there is an infinite Number of numerically different possible Bodies, perfectly alike, among which God chooses, by a self-determining Power, when he goes about to create Bodies.

If in the Instance of the two Spheres, perfectly alike, it be supposed possible that God might have made them in a contrary Position; that which is made at the right Hand, being made at the Left; then I ask, Whether it is not evidently equally possible, if God had made but one of them, and that in the Place of the right-hand Globe, that he might have made that numerically different from what it is, and numerically different from what he did make it; tho' perfectly alike, and in the same Place; and at the same Time, and in every Respect, in the same Circumstances and Relations? Namely, Whether he might not have made it numerically the same with that which he has now made at the left Hand; and so have left that which is now created at the right Hand, in a State of Non-Existence? And if so, whether it would not have been possible to have made one in that Place, perfectly like these, and yet numerically differing from both? And let it be considered, whether from this Notion of a numerical Difference in Bodies, perfectly equal and alike, which numerical Difference is something inherent in the Bodies themselves, and diverse from the Difference of Place or Time, or any Circumstance whatsoever; it will not follow, that there is an infinite Number of numerically different possible Bodies, perfectly alike, among which God chuses, by a self-determining Power, when he goes about to create Bodies.