A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…

The Consideration of these Things may help us to a sufficient Answer to the Cavils of Arminians concerning what has been supposed by many Calvinists, of a Distinction between a secret and revealed Will of God, and their Diversity one from the other; supposing, that the Calvinists herein ascribe inconsistent Wills to the most High: Which is without any Foundation. God's secret and revealed Will, or in other▪ Words, his disposing and preceptive Will may be diverse, and exercised in dissimilar Acts, the one in disapproving and opposing, the other in willing and determining, without any Inconsistence. Because, altho' these dissimilar Exercises of the divine Will may in some Respects relate to the same Things, yet in Strictness they have different and contrary Objects, the one Evil and the other Good. Thus for Instance, the Crucifixion of Christ was a Thing contrary to the revealed or preceptive Will of God; because, as it was viewed and done by his malignant Murderers, it was a Thing infinitely contrary to the holy Nature of God, and so necessarily contrary to the holy Inclination of his Heart revealed in his Law. Yet this don't at all hinder but that the Crucifixion of Christ, considered with all those glorious Consequences, which were within the View of the divine Omniscience, might be indeed, and therefore might appear to God to be, a glorious Event; and consequently be agreeable to his Will, tho' this Will may be secret, i. e. not revealed in God's Law. And thus considered, the Crucifixion of Christ was not evil, but good. If the secret Exercises of God's Will were of a Kind that is dissimilar and contrary to his revealed Will, respecting the same, or like Objects; if the Objects of both were good, or both evil; then indeed to ascribe contrary Kinds of Volition or Inclination to God, respecting these Objects, would be to ascribe an inconsistent Will to God: but to ascribe to Him different and opposite Exercises of Heart, respecting different Objects, and Objects contrary one to another, is so far from supposing God's Will to be inconsistent with it self, that it can't be supposed consistent with it self any other Way. For any Being to have a Will of Choice respecting Good, and at the same Time a Will of Rejection and Refusal respecting Evil, is to be very consistent: But the contrary, viz.

The Consideration of these Things may help us to a sufficient Answer to the Cavils of Arminians concerning what has been supposed by many Calvinists, of a Distinction between a secret and revealed Will of God, and their Diversity one from the other; supposing, that the Calvinists herein ascribe inconsistent Wills to the most High: Which is without any Foundation. God's secret and revealed Will, or in other Words, his disposing and preceptive Will may be diverse, and exercised in dissimilar Acts, the one in disapproving and opposing, the other in willing and determining, without any Inconsistence. Because, altho' these dissimilar Exercises of the divine Will may in some Respects relate to the same Things, yet in Strictness they have different and contrary Objects, the one Evil and the other Good. Thus for Instance, the Crucifixion of Christ was a Thing contrary to the revealed or preceptive Will of God; because, as it was view'd and done by his malignant Murderers, it was a Thing infinitely contrary to the holy Nature of God, and so necessarily contrary to the holy Inclination of his Heart revealed in his Law. Yet this don't at all hinder but that the Crucifixion of Christ, considered with all those glorious Consequences, which were within the View of the divine Omniscience, might be indeed, and therefore might appear to God to be, a glorious Event; and consequently be agreable to his Will, tho' this Will may be secret, i. e. not revealed in God's Law. And thus considered, the Crucifixion of Christ was not evil, but good. If the secret Exercises of God's Will were of a Kind that is dissimilar and contrary to his revealed Will, respecting the same, or like Objects; if the Objects of both were good, or both evil; then indeed to ascribe contrary Kinds of Volition or Inclination to God, respecting these Objects, would be to ascribe an inconsistent Will to God: but to ascribe to Him different and opposite Exercises of Heart, respecting different Objects, and Objects contrary one to another, is so far from supposing God's Will to be inconsistent with it self, that it can't be supposed consistent with it self any other Way. For any Being to have a Will of Choice respecting Good, and at the same Time a Will of Rejection and Refusal respecting Evil, is to be very consistent: But the contrary, viz.