We need not be afraid to affirm, that if a wise and good Man knew with absolute Certainty, it would be best, all Things considered, that there should be such a Thing as moral Evil in the World, it would not be contrary to his Wisdom and Goodness, for him to choose that it should be so. 'Tis no evil Desire, to desire Good, and to desire that which, all Things considered, is best. And it is no unwise Choice, to choose that That should be, which it is best should be; and to choose the Existence of that Thing concerning which this is known, viz. that it is best it should be, and so is known in the whole to be most worthy to be chosen. On the contrary, it would be a plain Defect in Wisdom and Goodness, for him not to choose it. And the Reason why he might not order it, if he were able, would not be because he might not desire it, but only the ordering of that Matter don't belong to him. But it is no Harm for Him who is by Right, and in the greatest Propriety, the supreme Orderer of all Things, to order every ⟨p. 267⟩Thing in such a Manner, as it would be a Point of Wisdom in Him to choose that they should be ordered. If it would be a plain Defect of Wisdom and Goodness in a Being, not to choose that That should be, which He certainly knows it would, all Things considered, be best should be (as was but now observed) then it must be impossible for a Being who has no Defect of Wisdom and Goodness, to do otherwise than choose it should be; and that, for this very Reason, because He is perfectly wise and good. And if it be agreeable to perfect Wisdom and Goodness for him to choose that it should be, and the ordering of all Things supremely and perfectly belongs to him, it must be agreeable to infinite Wisdom and Goodness, to order that it should be. If the Choice is good, the ordering and disposing Things according to that Choice must also be good. It can be no Harm in one to whom it belongs to do his Will in the Armies of Heaven, and amongst the Inhabitants of the Earth, to execute a good Volition. If his Will be good, and the Object of his Will be, all Things considered, good and best, then the choosing or willing it is not willing Evil that Good may come. And if so, then his ordering according to that Will is not doing Evil, that Good may come.
We need not be afraid to affirm, that if a wise and good Man knew with absolute Certainty, it would be best, all Things considered, that there should be such a Thing as moral Evil in the World, it would not be contrary to his Wisdom and Goodness, for him to chuse that it should be so. 'Tis no evil Desire, to desire Good, and to desire that which, all Things considered, is best. And it is no unwise Choice, to chuse that That should be, which it is best should be; and to chuse the Existence of that Thing concerning which this is known, viz. that it is best it should be, and so is known in the whole to be most worthy to be chosen. On the contrary, it would be a plain Defect in Wisdom and Goodness, for him not to chuse it. And the Reason why he might not order it, if he were able, would not be because he might not desire it, but only the ordering of that Matter don't belong to him. But it is no Harm for Him who is by Right, and in the greatest Propriety, the supreme Orderer of all Things, to order every ⟨p. 267⟩Thing in such a Manner, as it would be a Point of Wisdom in Him to chuse that they should be ordered. If it would be a plain Defect of Wisdom and Goodness in a Being, not to chuse that That should be, which He certainly knows it would, all Things considered, be best should be (as was but now observed) then it must be impossible for a Being who has no Defect of Wisdom and Goodness, to do otherwise than chuse it should be; and that, for this very Reason, because He is perfectly wise and good. And if it be agreable to perfect Wisdom and Goodness for him to chuse that it should be, and the ordering of all Things supremely and perfectly belongs to him, it must be agreable to infinite Wisdom and Goodness, to order that it should be. If the Choice is good, the ordering and disposing Things according to that Choice must also be good. It can be no Harm in one to whom it belongs to do his Will in the Armies of Heaven, and amongst the Inhabitants of the Earth, to execute a good Volition. If his Will be good, and the Object of his Will be, all Things considered, good and best, then the chusing or willing it is not willing Evil that Good may come. And if so, then his ordering according to that Will is not doing Evil, that Good may come.
