A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…

If any Objector should say; All that these Things amount to, is, that God may do Evil that Good may come; which is justly esteemed immoral and sinful in Men; and therefore may be justly esteemed inconsistent with the moral Perfections of God. I answer, That for God to dispose and permit Evil, in the Manner that has been spoken of, is not to do Evil that Good may come; for it is not to do Evil at all.—In Order to a Thing's being morally Evil, there must be one of these Things belonging to it: Either it must be a Thing unfit and unsuitable in it's own Nature; or it must have a bad Tendency; or it must proceed from an evil Disposition, and be done for an evil End. But neither of these Things can be attributed to God's ordering and permitting such Events, as the immoral Acts of Creatures, for good Ends. (1.) It is not unfit in it's own Nature, that He should do so. For it is in it's own Nature fit, that infinite Wisdom, and not blind Chance, should dispose moral Good and Evil in the World. And 'tis fit, that the Being who has infinite Wisdom, and is the Maker, Owner, and supreme Governor of the World, should take Care of that Matter. And therefore there is no Unfitness, or Unsuitableness in his doing it. It may be unfit, and so immoral, for any other Beings to go about to order this Affair; because they are not possessed of a Wisdom, that in any Manner fits them for it; and in other Respects they are not fit to be trusted with this Affair; nor does it belong to them, they not being the Owners and Lords of the Universe.

If any Objector should say; All that these Things amount to, is, that God may do Evil that Good may come; which is justly esteem'd immoral and sinful in Men; and therefore may be justly esteem'd inconsistent with the moral Perfections of God. I answer, That for God to dispose and permit Evil, in the Manner that has been spoken of, is not to do Evil that Good may come; for it is not to do Evil at all.—In Order to a Thing's being morally Evil, there must be one of these Things belonging to it: Either it must be a Thing unfit and unsuitable in it's own Nature; or it must have a bad Tendency; or it must proceed from an evil Disposition, and be done for an evil End. But neither of these Things can be attributed to God's ordering and permitting such Events, as the immoral Acts of Creatures, for good Ends. (1.) It is not unfit in it's own Nature, that He should do so. For it is in it's own Nature fit, that infinite Wisdom, and not blind Chance, should dispose moral Good and Evil in the World. And 'tis fit, that the Being who has infinite Wisdom, and is the Maker, Owner, and supreme Governor of the World, should take Care of that Matter. And therefore there is no Unfitness, or Unsuitableness in his doing it. It may be unfit, and so immoral, for any other Beings to go about to order this Affair; because they are not possess'd of a Wisdom, that in any Manner fits them for it; and in other Respects they are not fit to be trusted with this Affair; nor does it belong to them, they not being the Owners and Lords of the Universe.