A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…

4. It follows from what has been observed, that when these Terms necessary, impossible, irresistible, unable &c. are used in Cases wherein no Opposition, or insufficient Will or Endeavour, is supposed, or can be supposed, but the very Nature of the supposed Case it self excludes and denies any such Opposition, Will or Endeavour; these Terms are then not used in their proper Signification, but quite beside their Use in common Speech. The Reason is manifest; namely, that in such Cases, we can't use the Words with Reference to a supposable Opposition, Will or Endeavour. And therefore if any Man uses these Terms in such Cases, he either uses them nonsensically, or in some new Sense, diverse from their original and proper Meaning. As for Instance; If a Man should affirm after this Manner, That it is necessary for a Man, and what must be, that a Man should choose Virtue rather than Vice, during the Time that he prefers Virtue to Vice; and that it is a Thing impossible and irresistible, that it should be otherwise than that he should have this Choice, so long as this Choice continues; such a Man would use these Terms must, irresistible &c. with perfect Insignificence and Nonsense, or in some new Sense, diverse from their common Use; which is with Reference, as has been observed, to supposable Opposition, Unwillingness and Resistance; whereas, here, the very Supposition excludes and denies any such Thing: for the Case supposed is that of being willing, and choosing.

4. It follows from what has been observed, that when these Terms necessary, impossible, irresistible, unable &c. are used in Cases wherein no Opposition, or insufficient Will or Endeavour, is supposed, or can be supposed, but the very Nature of the supposed Case it self excludes and denies any such Opposition, Will or Endeavour; these Terms are then not used in their proper Signification, but quite beside their Use in common Speech. The Reason is manifest; namely, that in such Cases, we can't use the Words with Reference to a supposable Opposition, Will or Endeavour. And therefore if any Man uses these Terms in such Cases, he either uses them nonsensically, or in some new Sense, diverse from their original and proper Meaning. As for Instance; If a Man should affirm after this Manner, That it is necessary for a Man, and what must be, that a Man should chuse Virtue rather than Vice, during the Time that he prefers Virtue to Vice; and that it is a Thing impossible and irresistable, that it should be otherwise than that he should have this Choice, so long as this Choice continues; such a Man would use these Terms must, irresistible &c. with perfect Insignificence and Nonsense, or in some new Sense, diverse from their common Use; which is with Reference, as has been observed, to supposable Opposition, Unwillingness and Resistance; whereas, here, the very Supposition excludes and denies any such Thing: for the Case supposed is that of being willing, and chusing.