A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…

The Things which have been observed, do also take off the main Objections of Arminians against the Doctrine of efficacious Grace; and at the same Time, prove the Grace of God in a Sinner's Conversion (if there be any Grace or divine Influence in the Affair) to be efficacious, yea, and irresistible too, if by irresistible is meant, that which is attended with a moral Necessity, which it is impossible should ever be violated by any Resistance. The main Objection of Arminians against this Doctrine is, that it is inconsistent with their self-determining Freedom of Will; and that it is repugnant to the Nature of Virtue, that it should be wrought in the Heart by the determining Efficacy and Power of another, instead of its being owing to a self-moving Power; that in that Case, the Good which is wrought, would not be our Virtue, but rather God's Virtue; because it is not the Person in whom it is wrought, that is the determining Author of it, but God that wrought it in him.—But the Things which are the Foundation of these Objections, have been considered; and it has been demonstrated, that the Liberty of moral Agents does not consist in self-determining Power; and that there is no Need of any such Liberty, in order to the Nature of Virtue; nor does it at all hinder, but that the State or Act of the Will may be the Virtue of the Subject, though it be not from Self-determination, but the Determination of an extrinsic Cause; even so as to cause the Event to be morally necessary to the Subject of it. And as it has been proved, that nothing in the State or Acts of the Will of Man is contingent; but that on the contrary, every Event of this Kind is necessary, by a moral Necessity; and has also been now demonstated, that the Doctrine of an ⟨p. 289⟩universal determining Providence, follows from that Doctrine of Necessity, which was proved before: And so, that God does decisively, in his Providence, order all the Volitions of moral Agents, either by positive Influence or Permission: And it being allowed on all Hands, that what God does in the Affair o• Man's virtuous Volitions, whether it be more or less, is by some positive Influence, and not by mere Permission, as in the Affair of a sinful Volition: If we put these Things together, it will follow, that God's Assistance or Influence, must be determining and decisive, or must be attended with a moral Necessity of the Event;

The Things which have been observed, do also take off the main Objections of Arminians against the Doctrine of efficacious Grace; and at the same Time, prove the Grace of God in a Sinner's Conversion (if there be any Grace or divine Influence in the Affair) to be efficacious, yea, and irresistible too, if by irresistible is meant, that which is attended with a moral Necessity, which it is impossible should ever be violated by any Resistence. The main Objection of Arminians against this Doctrine is, that it is inconsistent with their self-determining Freedom of Will; and that it is repugnant to the Nature of Vertue, that it should be wrought in the Heart by the determining Efficacy and Power of another, instead of its being owing to a self-moving Power; that in that Case, the Good which is wrought, would not be our Vertue, but rather God's Vertue; because it is not the Person in whom it is wrought, that is the determining Author of it, but God that wrought it in him.—But the Things which are the Foundation of these Objections, have been considered; and it has been demonstrated, that the Liberty of moral Agents does not consist in self-determining Power; and that there is no Need of any such Liberty, in order to the Nature of Vertue; nor does it at all hinder, but that the State or Act of the Will may be the Vertue of the Subject, though it be not from Self-determination, but the Determination of an extrinsic Cause; even so as to cause the Event to be morally necessary to the Subject of it. And as it has been proved, that nothing in the State or Acts of the Will of Man is contingent; but that on the contrary, every Event of this Kind is necessary, by a moral Necessity; and has also been now demonstated, that the Doctrine of an