N05663:72
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, virtue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, vertue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]
printed by S. Kneeland, 1754
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
What is sometimes given as the Definition of Philosophical Necessity, namely, That by which a Thing cannot but be, or whereby it cannot be otherwise, fails of being a proper Explanation of it, on two Accounts: First, the Words Can, or Cannot, need Explanation as much as the Word Necessity; and the former may as well be explained by the latter, as the latter by the former. Thus, if any one asked us what we mean, when we say, a Thing cannot but be, we might explain our selves by saying, we mean, it must necessarily be so; as well as explain Necessity, by saying, it is that by which a Thing cannot but be. And Secondly, this Definition is liable to the fore-mentioned great Inconvenience: The Words cannot, or unable, are properly relative, and have Relation to Power exerted, or that may be exerted, in order to the Thing spoken of; to which, as I have now observed, the Word Necessity, as used by Philosophers, has no Reference.
What is sometimes given as the Definition of Philosophical Necessity, namely, That by which a Thing cannot but be, or whereby it cannot be otherwise, fails of being a proper Explanation of it, on two Accounts: First, the Words Can, or Cannot, need Explanation as much as the Word Necessity; and the former may as well be explained by the latter, as the latter by the former. Thus, if any one asked us what we mean, when we say, a Thing cannot but be, we might explain our selves by saying, we mean, it must necessarily be so; as well as explain Necessity, by saying, it is that by which a Thing cannot but be. And Secondly, this Definition is liable to the fore-mention'd great Inconvenience: The Words cannot, or unable, are properly relative, and have Relation to Power exerted, or that may be exerted, in order to the Thing spoken of; to which, as I have now observed, the Word Necessity, as used by Philosophers, has no Reference.
Philosophical Necessity is really Nothing else than the full and fixed Connection between the Things signified by the Subject & Predicate of a Proposition, which affirms Something to be true. When there is such a Connection, then the Thing affirmed in the Proposition is necessary, in a Philosophical Sense; whether any Opposition, or contrary Effort be supposed, or supposable in the Case, or no. When the Subject and Predicate of the Proposition, which affirms the Existence of any Thing, either Substance, Quality, Act or Circumstance, have a full and certain Connection, then the Existence or Being of that Thing is said to be necessary in a metaphysical Sense. And in this Sense I use the Word Necessity, in the following Discourse, when I endeavour to prove that Necessity is not inconsistent with Liberty.