A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…

(3.) The Subject and Predicate of a Proposition which affirms Something to be, may have a real and certain Connection consequentially; and so the Existence of the Thing may be consequentially necessary; as it may be surely and firmly connected with something else, that is necessary in one of the former Respects. As it is either fully and thoroughly connected with that which is absolutely necessary in its own ⟨p. 18⟩Nature, or with something which has already received and made sure of Existence. This Necessity lies in, or may be explained by the Connection of two or more Propositions one with another. Things which are perfectly connected with other Things that are necessary, are necessary Themselves, by a Necessity of Consequence.

And here it may be observed, that all Things which are future, or which will hereafter begin to be, which can be said to be necessary, are necessary only in this last Way. Their Existence is not necessary in it self; for if so, they always would have existed. Nor is their Existence become necessary by being made sure, by being already come to pass. Therefore, the only Way that any Thing that is to come to pass hereafter, is or can be necessary, is by a Connection with something that is necessary in it's own Nature, or something that already is, or has been; so that the one being supposed, the other certainly follows. And this also is the only Way that all Things past, excepting those which were from Eternity, could be necessary before they came to pass, or could come to pass necessarily; and therefore the only Way in which any Effect or Event, or any Thing whatsoever that ever has had, or will have a Beginning, has come into Being necessarily, or will hereafter necessarily exist. And therefore this is the Necessity which especially belongs to Controversies about the Acts of the Will.