A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…

And here it may be observed, that all Things which are future, or which will hereafter begin to be, which can be said to be necessary, are necessary only in this last Way. Their Existence is not necessary in it self; for if so, they always would have existed. Nor is their Existence become necessary by being made sure, by being already come to pass. Therefore, the only Way that any Thing that is to come to pass hereafter, is or can be necessary, is by a Connection with something that is necessary in it's own Nature, or something that already is, or has been; so that the one being supposed, the other certainly follows. And this also is the only Way that all Things past, excepting those which were from Eternity, could be necessary before they came to pass, or could come to pass necessarily; and therefore the only Way in which any Effect or Event, or any Thing whatsoever that ever has had, or will have a Beginning, has come into Being necessarily, or will hereafter necessarily exist. And therefore this is the Necessity which especially belongs to Controversies about the Acts of the Will.

It may be of some Use in these Controversies, further to observe concerning metaphysical Necessity, that (agreeable to the Distinction before observed of Necessity, as vulgarly understood) Things that exist may be said to be necessary, either with a general or particular Necessity. The Existence of a Thing may be said to be necessary with a general Necessity, when all Things whatsoever being considered, there is a Foundation for Certainty of their Existence; or when in the most general and universal View of Things, the Subject and Predicate of the Proposition, which affirms its Existence, would appear with an infallible Connection.

It may be of some Use in these Controversies, further to observe concerning metaphysical Necessity, that (agreable to the Distinction before observed of Necessity, as vulgarly understood) Things that exist may be said to be necessary, either with a general or particular Necessity. The Existence of a Thing may be said to be necessary with a gen•ral Necessity, when all Things whatsoever being considered, there is a Foundation for Certainty of their Existence; or when in the most general and universal View of Things, the Subject and Predicate of the Proposition, which affirms its Existence, would appear with an infallible Connection.