N06399:254
The great Christian doctrine of original sin defended
The great Christian doctrine of original sin defended; evidences of it's [sic] truth produced, and arguments to the contrary answered. Containing, in particular, a reply to the objections and arguings of Dr. John Taylor, in his book, entitled, "The Scripture-doctrine of original sin proposed to free and candid examination, &c. / By the late Reverend and learned Jonathan Edwards, president of the College of New-Jersey. ; [Thirteen lines of quotations]The great Christian doctrine of original sin defended; evidences of it's [sic] truth produced, and arguments to the contrary answered. Containing, in particular, a reply to the objections and arguings of Dr. John Taylor, in his book, intitled, "The Scripture-doctrine of original sin proposed to free and candid examination, &c. / By the late Reverend and learned Jonathan Edwards, president of the College of New-Jersey. ; [Thirteen lines of quotations]
printed by S. Kneeland, 1758
The great Christian Doctrine of ORIGINAL SIN defended. › Part 1 › Chapter 1 › Section 9
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
As has been often observed, a steady Effect requires a steady Cause; but Free-Will, without any previous Propensity, to influence it's Determinations, is no permanent Cause; Nothing can be conceived of, further from it: For the very Notion of Freedom of Will consisting in self-determining Power, implies Contingence: And if the Will is free in that Sense, that it is perfectly free from any Government of previous Inclination, it's Freedom must imply the most absolute and perfect Contingence: And surely Nothing can be conceived of, more unfixed than that. The Notion of Liberty of Will, in this Sense, implies perfect Freedom from every Thing that should previously fix, bind or determine it; that it may be left to be fixed and determined wholly by itself: Therefore, it's Determinations must be previously altogether unfixed. And can that which is so unfixed, so contingent, be a Cause sufficient to account for an Effect, in such a Manner, and to such a Degree, permanent, fixed and constant?
As has been often observed, a steady Effect requires a steady Cause; but Free-Will, without any previous Propensity, to influence it's Determinations, is no permanent Cause; Nothing can be conceived of, further from it: For the very Notion of Freedom of Will consisting in self-determining Power, implies Contingence: And if the Will is free in that Sense, that it is perfectly free from any Government of previous Inclination, it's Freedom must imply the most absolute and perfect Contingence: And surely Nothing can be conceived of, more unfix'd than that. The Notion of Liberty of Will, in this Sense, implies perfect Freedom from every Thing that should previously fix, bind or determine it; that it may be left to be fix'd and determin'd wholly by itself: Therefore, it's Determinations must be previously altogether unfix'd. And can that which is so unfixed, so contingent, be a Cause sufficient to account for an Effect, in such a Manner, and to such a Degree, permanent, fix'd and constant?
When Men see only one particular Person going on in a certain Course with great Constancy, against all Manner of Means to dissuade him, do they judge this to be no Argument of any fixed Disposition of Mind, because he being free may determine to do so, if he will, without any such Disposition? Or if they see a Nation or People that differ greatly from other Nations, in such and such Instances of their constant Conduct, as tho' their Tempers and Inclinations were very diverse, and any should deny it to be from any such Cause, and should say, We can't judge at all of the Temper or Disposition of any Nation or People by any thing observable in their constant Practice or Behaviour, because they have all Free-Will, and therefore may all choose to act so, if they please, without any thing in their Temper or Inclination to bias 'em; would such an Account of such Effects be satisfying to the Reason of Mankind?—But infinitely further would it be from