N06399:255
The great Christian doctrine of original sin defended
The great Christian doctrine of original sin defended; evidences of it's [sic] truth produced, and arguments to the contrary answered. Containing, in particular, a reply to the objections and arguings of Dr. John Taylor, in his book, entitled, "The Scripture-doctrine of original sin proposed to free and candid examination, &c. / By the late Reverend and learned Jonathan Edwards, president of the College of New-Jersey. ; [Thirteen lines of quotations]The great Christian doctrine of original sin defended; evidences of it's [sic] truth produced, and arguments to the contrary answered. Containing, in particular, a reply to the objections and arguings of Dr. John Taylor, in his book, intitled, "The Scripture-doctrine of original sin proposed to free and candid examination, &c. / By the late Reverend and learned Jonathan Edwards, president of the College of New-Jersey. ; [Thirteen lines of quotations]
printed by S. Kneeland, 1758
The great Christian Doctrine of ORIGINAL SIN defended. › Part 1 › Chapter 1 › Section 9
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
When Men see only one particular Person going on in a certain Course with great Constancy, against all Manner of Means to dissuade him, do they judge this to be no Argument of any fixed Disposition of Mind, because he being free may determine to do so, if he will, without any such Disposition? Or if they see a Nation or People that differ greatly from other Nations, in such and such Instances of their constant Conduct, as tho' their Tempers and Inclinations were very diverse, and any should deny it to be from any such Cause, and should say, We can't judge at all of the Temper or Disposition of any Nation or People by any thing observable in their constant Practice or Behaviour, because they have all Free-Will, and therefore may all choose to act so, if they please, without any thing in their Temper or Inclination to bias 'em; would such an Account of such Effects be satisfying to the Reason of Mankind?—But infinitely further would it be from ⟨p. 108⟩satisfying a considerate Mind, to account for the constant and universal Sinfulness of Mankind, by saying, that the Will of all Mankind is free, and therefore all Mankind may, if they please, make themselves Wicked: They are free when they first begin to act as moral Agents, and therefore all may, if they please, begin to sin as soon as they begin to act: They are free as long as they continue to act in the World; and therefore they may all commit Sin continually, if they will: Men of all Nations are free, and therefore all Nations may act alike in these Respects, if they please (tho' some don't know how other Nations do act)—Men of high and low Condition, learned and ignorant, are free; and therefore they may agree in acting Wickedly, if they please (tho' they don't consult together)—Men in all Ages are free, and therefore Men in one Age may all agree with Men in every other Age in Wickedness, if they please (tho' they don't know how Men in other Ages have acted) &c. &c. Let every one judge whether such an Account of Things can satisfy Reason.
When Men see only one particular Person going on in a certain Course with great Constancy, against all Manner of Means to dissuade him, do they judge this to be no Argument of any fix'd Disposition of Mind, because he being free may determine to do so, if he will, without any such Disposition? Or if they see a Nation or People that differ greatly from other Nations, in such and such Instances of their constant Conduct, as tho' their Tempers and Inclinations were very diverse, and any should deny it to be from any such Cause, and should say, We can't judge at all of the Temper or Disposition of any Nation or People by any thing observable in their constant Practice or Behaviour, because they have all Free-Will, and therefore may all chuse to act so, if they please, without any thing in their Temper or Inclination to biass 'em; would such an Account of such Effects be satisfying to the Reason of Mankind?—But infinitely further would it be from