The great Christian doctrine of original sin defended
The great Christian doctrine of original sin defended; evidences of it's [sic] truth produced, and arguments to the contrary answered. Containing, in particular, a reply to the objections and arguings of Dr. John Taylor, in his book, entitled, "The Scripture-doctrine of original sin proposed to free and candid examination, &c. / By the late Reverend and learned Jonathan Edwards, president of the College of New-Jersey. ; [Thirteen lines of quotations]The great Christian doctrine of original sin defended; evidences of it's [sic] truth produced, and arguments to the contrary answered. Containing, in particular, a reply to the objections and arguings of Dr. John Taylor, in his book, intitled, "The Scripture-doctrine of original sin proposed to free and candid examination, &c. / By the late Reverend and learned Jonathan Edwards, president of the College of New-Jersey. ; [Thirteen lines of quotations]
Jonathan Edwards 1703–1758printed by S. Kneeland, 1758
[2], xviii, 386, [10] p. ; 21 cm. (4to and 8vo) · 140k words · Evans 8118
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
That the Posterity of Adam should be born without Holiness, and so with a depraved Nature, comes to pass as much by the established Course of Nature, as the Continuance of a corrupt Disposition in a particular Person, after he once has it; or as much as Adam's continuing unholy and corrupt, after he had once lost his Holiness. For Adam's Posterity are from Him, and as it were in him, and belonging to him, according to an established Course of Nature,as much as the Branches of a Tree are, according to a Course of Nature,from the Tree, in the Tree, & belonging to the Tree; or (to make use of the Comparison which Dr.T. himself chooses and makes use of from Time to Time, as proper to illustrate the Matter*) just as the Acorn is derived from the Oak. And I think, the Acorn is as much derived from the Oak, according to the Course of Nature, as the Buds and Branches. 'Tis true, that God, by his own almighty Power, creates the Soul of the Infant; and 'tis also true, as Dr. T. often insists, that God, by his immediate Power, ferns and fashions the Body of the Infant in the Womb; yet he does both according to that Course of Nature, which he has been pleased to establish. The ⟨p. 323⟩Course of Nature is demonstrated, by late Improvements in Philosophy, to be indeed what our Author himself says it is, viz. Nothing but the established Order of the Agency and Operation of the Author of Nature. And though there be the immediate Agency of God in bringing the Soul into Existence in Generation, yet 'tis done according to the Method and Order established by the Author of Nature, as much as his producing the Bud, or the Acorn of the Oak; and as much as his continuing a particular Person in Being, after he once has Existence. God's immediate Agency in bringing the Soul of a Child into Being, is as much according to an established Order, as his immediate Agency in any of the Works of Nature whatsoever. 'Tis agreeable to the established Order of Nature, that the good Qualities wanting in the Tree, should also be wanting in the Branches and Fruit. 'Tis agreeable to the Order of Nature; that when a particular Person is without good moral Qualities in his Heart, he should continue without 'em, till some new Cause or Efficiency produces them:
That the Posterity of Adam should be born without Holiness, and so with a depraved Nature, comes to pass as much by the established Course of Nature, as the Continuance of a corrupt Disposition in a particular Person, after he once has it; or as much as Adam's continuing unholy and corrupt, after he had once lost his Holiness. For Adam's Posterity are from Him, and as it were in him, and belonging to him, according to an established Course of Nature,as much as the Branches of a Tree are, according to a Course of Nature,from the Tree, in the Tree, & belonging to the Tree; or (to make use of the Comparison which Dr.T. himself chuses and makes use of from Time to Time, as proper to illustrate the Matter
) just as the Acorn is derived from the Oak. And I think, the Acorn is as much derived from the Oak, according to the Course of Nature, as the Buds and Branches. 'Tis true, that God, by his own almighty Power, creates the Soul of the Infant; and 'tis also true, as Dr. T. often insists, that God, by his immediate Power, fer•s and fashions the Body of the Infant in the Womb; yet he does both according to that Course of Nature, which he has been pleased to establish. The
⟨p. 323⟩
Course of Nature is demonstrated, by late Improvements in Philosophy, to be indeed what our Author himself says it is, viz. Nothing but the established Order of the Agency and Operation of the Author of Nature. And thô there be the immediate Agency of God in bringing the Soul into Existence in Generation, yet 'tis done according to the Method and Order established by the Author of Nature, as much as his producing the Bud, or the Acorn of the Oak; and as much as his continuing a particular Person in Being, after he once has Existence. God's immediate Agency in bringing the Soul of a Child into Being, is as much according to an established Order, as his immediate Agency in any of the Works of Nature whatsoever. 'Tis agreable to the established Order of Nature, that the good Qualities wanting in the Tree, should also be wanting in the Branches and Fruit. 'Tis agreable to the Order of Nature; that when a particular Person is without good moral Qualities in his Heart, he should continue without 'em, till some new Cause or Efficiency produces them:
And 'tis as much agreeable to an established Course and Order of Nature, that since Adam, the Head of the Race of Mankind, the Root of that great Tree with many Branches springing from it, was deprived of original Righteousness, the Branches should come forth without it. Or, if any dislike the Word, Nature, as used in this last Case, and in Stead of it c•use to call it a Constitution, or established Order of successive Events, the Alteration of the Name won't in the least alter the State of the present Argument. Where the Name, Nature, is allowed without Dispute, no more is meant than an established Method and Order of Events, settled and limited by divine Wisdom.
And 'tis as much agreable to an established Course and Order of Nature, that since Adam, the Head of the Race of Mankind, the Root of that great Tree with many Branches springing from it, was deprived of original Righteousness, the Branches should come forth without it. Or, if any dislike the Word, Nature, as used in this last Case, and in Stead of it c•use to call it a Constitution, or established Order of successive Events, the Alteration of the Name won't in the least alter the State of the present Argument. Where the Name, Nature, is allowed without Dispute, no more is meant than an established Method and Order of Events, settled and limited by divine Wisdom.
If any should object to this, That if the Want of original Righteousness be thus according to an established Course of Nature, then why are not Principles of Holiness▪ when restored by divine Grace, also communicated to Posterity? I answer, The divine Laws and Establishments ⟨p. 324⟩of the Author of Nature are precisely settled by him, as he pleaseth, and limited by his Wisdom.—Grace is introduced among the Race of Mankind by a new Establishment; not on the Foot of the original Establishment of God, as the Head of the natural World, and Author of the first Creation; but by a Constitution of a vastly higher Kind; wherein Christ is made the Root of the Tree, whose Branches are his spiritual Seed and He is the Head of the new Creation; of which I need not stand now to speak particularly.
But here I desire it may be noted, that I don't suppose, the natural Depravity of the Posterity of Adam is owing to the Course of Nature only; 'tis also owing to the just Judgment of God. But yet I think, it is as truly, and in the same Manner, owing to the Course of Nature, that Adam's Posterity come into the World without original Righteousness, as that Adam continued without it, after he had once lost it.—That Adam continued destitute of Holiness, when he had lost it, and would always have so continued, had it not been restored by a Redeemer, was not only a natural Consequence, according to the Course of Things established by God, as the Author of Nature; but it was also a penal Consequence, or a Punishment of his Sin. God, in righteous Judgment, continued to absent himself from Adam, after he became a Rebel; and withheld from him now those Influences of the holy Spirit, which he before had. And just thus, I suppose it to be with every natural Branch of Mankind: all are looked upon as sinning in and with their common Root; and God righteously with-holds special Influences & spiritual Communications from all. for this Sin.—But of the Manner and Order of these Things, more may be said in the next Chapter.
On the whole, this grand Objection against the Doctrine of Men's being born corrupt, That it makes Him who gave us our Being, to be the Cause of the Being of Corruption, can have no more Force in it, than a like Argument has to prove, that if Men by a Course of Nature continue Wicked, or remain without Goodness, after they ⟨p. 325⟩have by vicious Acts contracted vicious Habits, and so made themselves wicked, it makes Him who is the Cause of their Continuance in Being, and the Cause of the Continuance of the Course of Nature, to be the Cause of their continued Wickedness. Dr. T. says, *God would not make any thing that is hateful to him; because, by the very Terms, He would hate to make such a Thing. But if this be good arguing in the Case to which it is applied, may I not as well say, God would not continue a Thing in Being that is hateful to him; because, by the very Terms, he would hate to continue such a Thing in Being? I think, the very Terms do as much (and no more) infer one of these Propositions, as the other.—In like Manner, the rest that he says on that Head, may be shown to be unreasonable, by only substituting the Word, continue, in the Place of, make and propagate. I may fairly imitate his way of Reasoning, thus: To say, God continues us according to his own original Decree, or Law of Continuation, which obliges him to continue us in a Manner he abhors, is really to make bad worse: for it is supposing him to be defective in Wisdom, or by his own Decree or Law to lay such a Constraint upon his own Actions, that he cannot do what he would; but is continually doing what he would not, what he hates to do, and what he condemns in us; viz. continuing us sinful, when he condemns us for continuing our selves sinful.—If the Reasoning be weak in the one Case, it's no less so in the other.
On the whole, this grand Objection against the Doctrine of Men's being born corrupt, That it makes Him who gave us our Being, to be the Cause of the Being of Corruption, can have no more Force in it, than a like Argument has to prove, that if Men by a Course of Nature continue Wicked, or remain without Goodness, after they ⟨p. 325⟩have by vicious Acts contracted vicious Habits, and so made themselves wicked, it makes Him who is the Cause of their Continuance in Being, and the Cause of the Continuance of the Course of Nature, to be the Cause of their continued Wickedness. Dr. T. says, *God would not make any thing that is hateful to him; because, by the very Terms, He would hate to make such a Thing. But if this be good arguing in the Case to which it is applied, may I not as well say, God would not continue a Thing in Being that is hateful to him; because, by the very Terms, he would hate to continue such a Thing in Being? I think, the very Terms do as much (and no more) infer one of these Propositions, as the other.—In like Manner, the rest that he says on that Head, may be shewn to be unreasonable, by only substituting the Word, continue, in the Place of, make and propagate. I may fairly imitate his way of Reasoning, thus: To say, God continues us according to his own original Decree, or Law of Continuation, which obliges him to continue us in a Manner he abhors, is really to make bad worse: for it is supposing him to be defective in Wisdom, or by his own Decree or Law to lay such a Constraint upon his own Actions, that he cannot do what he would; but is continually doing what he would not, what he hates to do, and what he condemns in us; viz. continuing us sinful, when he condemns us for continuing our selves sinful.—If the Reasoning be weak in the one Case, it's no less so in the other.
If any shall still insist, That there is a Difference, between God's so disposing Things as that Depravity of Heart shall be continued, according to the settled Course of Nature, in the same Person, who has by his own Fault introduced it,—and his so disposing as that Men, according to a Course of Nature, should be born with Depravity, in Consequence of Adam's introducing Sin, by his Act, which we had no Concern in, and cannot be justly charged ⟨p. 326⟩with: On this I would observe, that it is quite going off the Objection, which we have been upon, from God's Agency, and flying to another. It is then no longer insisted on, that simply for him, from whose Agency the Course of Nature and our Existence derive, so to dispose Things, as that we should have Existence in a corrupt State, is for him to be the Author of Sin: But the Plea now advanced is, That it is not proper and just for such an Agent so to dispose in this Case, and only in Consequence of Adam's Sin; it not being just to charge Adam's Sin to his Posterity. And this Matter shall be particularly considered, in Answer to the next Objection; to which I now proceed.
That great Objection against the Imputation of Adam's Sin to his Posterity, considered, That such Imputation is unjust and unreasonable, inasmuch as Adam and his Posterity are not one and the same. With a brief Reflection subjoined, on what some have supposed, of God's imputing the Guilt of Adam's Sin to his Posterity, but in an infinitely less Degree, than to Adam himself.
That we may proceed with the greater Clearness in considering the main Objections against supposing the Guilt of Adam's Sin to be imputed to his Posterity, I would premise some Observations with a View to the right Stating of the Doctrine of the Imputation of Adam's first Sin; and then show the Reasonableness of this Doctrine, in Opposition to the great Clamour raised against it on this Head.
THat we may proceed with the greater Clearness in considering the main Objections against supposing the Guilt of Adam's Sin to be imputed to his Posterity, I would premise some Observations with a View to the right Stating of the Doctrine of the Imputation of Adam's first Sin; and then shew the Reasonableness of this Doctrine, in Opposition to the great Clamour raised against it on this Head.
I think, it would go far towards directing us to the more clear and distinct conceiving and right stating of this Affair, if we steadily bear this in Mind; That God, in each Step ⟨p. 327⟩of his Proceeding with Adam, in Relation to the Covenant or Constitution established with him, looked on his Posterity as being One with him. (The Propriety of his looking upon them so, I shall speak to afterwards) And tho' he dealt more immediately with Adam, yet it was as the Head of the whole Body, & the Root of the whole Tree; and in his Proceedings with him, he dealt with all the Branches, as if they had been then existing in their Root.
I think, it would go far towards directing us to the more clear and distinct conceiving and right stating of this Affair, if we steadily bear this in Mind; That God, in each Step ⟨p. 327⟩of his Proceeding with Adam, in Relation to the Covenant or Constitution established with him, look'd on his Posterity as being One with him. (The Propriety of his looking upon them so, I shall speak to afterwards) And tho' he dealt more immediately with Adam, yet it was as the Head of the whole Body, & the Root of the whole Tree; and in his Proceedings with him, he dealt with all the Branches, as if they had been then existing in their Root.
From which it will follow, that both Guilt, or Exposedness to Punishment, and also Depravity of Heart, came upon Adam's Posterity just as they came upon him, as much as if he & they had all co-existed, like a Tree with many Branches; allowing only for the Difference necessarily resulting from the Place Adam stood in, as Head or Root of the whole, and being first and most immediately dealt with, & most immediately acting & suffering. Otherwise, it is as if, in every Step of Proceeding, every Alteration in the Root had been attended, at the same Instant, with the same Steps and Alterations throughout the whole Tree, in each individual Branch. I think, this will naturally follow on the Supposition of there being a constituted Oneness or Identity of Adam and his Posterity in this Affair.
Therefore I am humbly of Opinion, that if any have supposed the Children of Adam to come into the World with a double Guilt, one the Guilt of Adam's Sin, another the Guilt arising from their having a corrupt Heart, they have not so well conceived of the Matter. The Guilt a Man has upon his Soul at his first Existence, is one and simple; viz. the Guilt of the original Apostasy, the Guilt of the Sin by which the Species first rebelled against God. This, and the Guilt arising from the first Corruption or depraved Disposition of the Heart, are not to be looked upon as two things, distinctly imputed and charged upon Men in the Sight of God. Indeed the Guilt, that arises from the Corruption of the Heart, as it remains a confirmed Principle, and appears in it's consequent Operations, is a distinct and additional Guilt: but the Guilt arising from ⟨p. 328⟩the first existing of a depraved Disposition in Adam's Posterity, I apprehend, is not distinct from their Guilt of Adam's first Sin. For so it was not in Adam himself. The first evil Disposition or Inclination of the Heart of Adam to Sin, was not properly distinct from his first Act of Sin, but was included in it. The external Act he committed was no otherwise his, than as his Heart was in it, or as that Action proceeded from the wicked Inclination of his Heart. Nor was the Guilt he had, double, as for two distinct Sins: One, the Wickedness of his Heart and Will in that Affair; another, the Wickedness of the external Act, caused by his Heart. His Guilt was all truly from the Act of his inward Man; exclusive of which the Motions of his Body were no more than the Motions of any lifeless Instrument. His Sin consisted in Wickedness of Heart, fully sufficient for, and entirely amounting to, all that appeared in the Act he committed.
Therefore I am humbly of Opinion, that if any have supposed the Children of Adam to come into the World with a double Guilt, one the Guilt of Adam's Sin, another the Guilt arising from their having a corrupt Heart, they have not so well conceived of the Matter. The Guilt a Man has upon his Soul at his first Existence, is one and simple; viz. the Guilt of the original Apostacy, the Guilt of the Sin by which the Species first rebelled against God. This, and the Guilt arising from the first Corruption or depraved Disposition of the Heart, are not to be look'd upon as two things, distinctly imputed and charged upon Men in the Sight of God. Indeed the Guilt, that arises from the Corruption of the Heart, as it remains a confirmed Principle, and appears in it's consequent Operations, is a distinct and additional Guilt: but the Guilt arising from ⟨p. 328⟩the first existing of a depraved Disposition in Adam's Posterity, I apprehend, is not distinct from their Guilt of Adam's first Sin. For so it was not in Adam himself. The first evil Disposition or Inclination of the Heart of Adam to Sin, was not properly distinct from his first Act of Sin, but was included in it. The external Act he committed was no otherwise his, than as his Heart was in it, or as that Action proceeded from the wicked Inclination of his Heart. Nor was the Guilt he had, double, as for two distinct Sins: One, the Wickedness of his Heart and Will in that Affair; another, the Wickedness of the external Act, caused by his Heart. His Guilt was all truly from the Act of his inward Man; exclusive of which the Motions of his Body were no more than the Motions of any lifeless Instrument. His Sin consisted in Wickedness of Heart, fully sufficient for, and intirely amounting to, all that appeared in the Act he committed.
The depraved Disposition of Adam's Heart is to be considered two Ways. (1.) As the first rising of an evil Inclination in his Heart, exerted in his first Act of Sin, and the Ground of the complete Transgression. (2.) An evil Disposition of Heart continuing afterwards, as a confirmed Principle, that came by God's forsaking him; which was a Punishment of his first Transgression. This confirmed Corruption, by it's remaining and continued Operation, brought additional Guilt on his Soul.
The depraved Disposition of Adam's Heart is to be considered two Ways. (1.) As the first rising of an evil Inclin•tion in his Heart, exerted in his first Act of Sin, and the Ground of the compleat Transgression. (2.) An evil Disposition of Heart continuing afterwards, as a confirmed Principle, that came by God's forsaking him; which was a Punishment of his first Transgression. This confirmed Corruption, by it's remaining and continued Operation, brought additional Guilt on his Soul.
And in like Manner, Depravity of Heart is to be considered two Ways in Adam's Posterity. The first Existing of a corrupt Disposition in their Hearts is not to be looked upon as Sin belonging to them, distinct from their Participation of Adam's first Sin: it is as it were the extended Pollution of that Sin, through the whole Tree, by Virtue of the constituted Union of the Branches with the Root; or the Inherence of the Sin of that Head of the Species in the Members, in the Consent and Concurrence of the Hearts of the Members with the Head, in that first Act. (Which may be, without God's being the Author of Sin: about which I have spoken in the former Chapter.) ⟨p. 329⟩But the Depravity of Nature, remaining an established Principle in the Heart of a Child of Adam, and as exhibited in After-Operations, is a Consequence and Punishment of the first Apostasy thus participated, and brings new Guilt.—The first Being of an evil Disposition in the Heart of a Child of Adam, whereby he is disposed to approve of the Sin of his first Father, as fully as he himself approved of it when he committed it, or so far as to imply a full and perfect Consent of Heart to it, I think, is not to be looked upon as a Consequence of the Imputation of that first Sin, any more than the full Consent of Adam's own Heart in the Act of sinning; which was not consequent on the Imputation of his Sin to himself, but rather prior to it in the Order of Nature. Indeed the Derivation of the evil Disposition to the Hearts of Adam's Posterity, or rather the Co-existence of the evil Disposition, implied in Adam's first Rebellion, in the Root & Branches, is a Consequence of the Union, that the wise Author of the World has established between Adam & his Posterity; but not properly a Consequence of the Imputation of his Sin; nay rather antecedent to it, as it was in Adam himself. The first Depravity of Heart, and the Imputation of that Sin, are both the Consequen•es of that established Union; but yet in such Order, that the evil Disposition is first, and the Charge of Guilt consequent; as it was in the Case of Adam himself.*
And in like Manner, Depravity of Heart is to be considered two Ways in Adam's Posterity. The first Existing of a corrupt Disposition in their Hearts is not to be look'd upon as Sin belonging to them, distinct from their Participation of Adam's first Sin: it is as it were the extended Pollution of that Sin, through the whole Tree, by Virtue of the constituted Union of the Branches with the Root; or the Inherence of the Sin of that Head of the Species in the Members, in the Consent and Concurrence of the Hearts of the Members with the Head, in that first Act. (Which may be, without God's being the Author of Sin: about which I have spoken in the former Chapter.) ⟨p. 329⟩But the Depravity of Nature, remaining an established Principle in the Heart of a Child of Adam, and as exhibited in After-Operations, is a Consequence and Punishment of the first Apostacy thus participated, and brings new Guilt.—The first Being of an evil Disposition in the Heart of a Child of Adam, whereby he is disposed to approve of the Sin of his first Father, as fully as he himself approved of it when he committed it, or so far as to imply a full and perfect Consent of Heart to it, I think, is not to be look'd upon as a Consequence of the Imputation of that first Sin, any more than the full Consent of Adam's own Heart in the Act of sinning; which was not consequent on the Imputation of his Sin to himself, but rather prior to it in the Order of Nature. Indeed the Derivation of the evil Disposition to the Hearts of Adam's Posterity, or rather the Co-existence of the evil Disposition, implied in Adam's first Rebellion, in the Root & Branches, is a Consequence of the Union, that the wise Author of the World has established between Adam & his Posterity; but not properly a Consequence of the Imputation of his Sin; nay rather antecedent to it, as it was in Adam himself. The first Depravity of Heart, and the Imputation of that Sin, are both the Consequen•es of that established Union; but yet in such Order, that the evil Disposition is first, and the Charge of Guilt consequent; as it was in the Case of Adam himself.*
*My Meaning, in the whole of what has been here said, may be illustrated thus: Let us suppose, that Adam and all his Posterity had co-existed, and that his Posterity had been, thrô a Law of Nature established by the Creator, united to him, something as the Branches of a Tree are united to the Root, or the Members of the Body to the Head; so as to constitute as it were one complex Person, or one moral Whole: So that by the Law of Union there should have been a Communion and Co-existence in Acts & Affections; all jointly participating, and all concurring, as one Whole, in the Disposition & Action of the Head: as we see in the Body natural, the whole Body is affected as the Head is affected; and the whole Body concurs when the Head acts. Now, in this Case, the Hearts of all the Branches of Mankind, by the Constitution of Nature and Law of Union, would have been affected just as the Heart of Adam, their common Root, was affected. When the Heart of the Root, by a full Disposition committed the first Sin, the Hearts of all the Branches would have concurred; and when the Root, in Consequence of this, became guilty, so would all the Branches; and when the Heart of the Root, as a Punishment of the Sin committed, was forsaken of God, in like Manner would it have faired with all the Branches; and when the Heart of the Root, in Consequence of this, was confirmed in permanent Depravity, the Case would have been the same with all the Branches; and as new Guilt on the Soul of Adam would have been consequent on this, so also would it have been with his moral Branches. And thus all Things, with Relation to evil Disposition, Guilt, Pollution and Depravity, would exist, in the same Order and Dependence, in each Branch, as in the Root. Now, Difference of the Time of Existence don't at all hinder Things succeeding in the same Order, any more than Difference of Place in a Co-existence of Time. Here may be worthy to be observed, as in several Respects to the present Purpose, some Things that are said by Stapferus, an eminent Divine of Zurich in Switzerland, in his Theologia Polemica, published about fourteen Years ago;—in English as follows. Seeing all Adam's Posterity are derived from their first Parent, as their Root, the whole of the human Kind, with it's Root, may be considered as constituting but one Whole, or one Mass; so as not to be properly a Thing distinct from it's Root; the Posterity not differing from it, any otherwise than the Branches from the Tree. From which it easily appears, how that when the Root sin'd, all that which is derived from it, and with it constitutes but one Whole, may be looked upon as also sinning; seeing it is not distinct from the Root, but is one with it.—T•m. I. Chap. III. §. 856, 57. Tis objected, against the Imputation of Adam's Sin, that we never committed the same Sin with Adam, neither in Number nor in Kind. I answer, we should distinguish here between the Physical Act it self, which Adam committed, and the Morality of the Action, and Consent to it. If we have respect only to the external Act, to be sure it must be confess'd, that Adam's Posterity did not put forth their Hands to the forbidden Fruit: In which Sense, that Act of Transgression, and that Fall of Adam cannot be physically one with the Sin of his Posterity. But if we consider the Morality of the Action, and what Consent there is to it, it is altogether to be maintain'd, that his Posterity committed the same Sin, both in Number & in Kind, inasmuch as they are to be look'd upon as consenting to it. For where there is Consent to a Sin, there the same Sin is committed. Seeing therefore that Adam with all his Posterity constitute but one moral Person, and are united in the same Covenant, & are Transgressors of the same Law, they are also to be look'd upon as having, in a moral Estimation, committed the same Transgression of the Law, both in Number and in Kind. Therefore this Reasoning avails nothing against the righteous Imputation of the Sin of Adam to all Mankind, or to the whole moral Person that is consenting to it. And for the Reason mention'd, we may rather argue thus; The Sin of the Posterity, on Account of their Consent, and the moral View in which they are to be taken, is the same with the Sin of Adam, not only in Kind, but in Number; therefore the Sin of Adam is rightfully imputed to his Posterity.—Id. Tom. iv. Cap. 16. §. 60, 61. The Imputation of Adam's first Sin consists in Nothing else than this, that his Posterity are view'd as in the same Place with their Father, and are like him. But seeing, agreeable to what we have already proved, God might, according to his own righteous Judgment, which was founded on his most righteous Law, give Adam a Posterity that were like himself; and indeed it could not be otherwise, according to the very Laws of Nature; therefore he might also in righteous Judgment impute Adam's Sin to them: inasmuch as to give Adam a Posterity like himself, and to impute his Sin to them, is one and the same Thing. And therefore if the former be not contrary to the divine Perfections, so neither is the latter.—Our Adversaries contend with us chiefly on this Account, That according to our Doctrine of original Sin, such an Imputation of the first Sin is maintained, whereby God, without any Regard to universal native Corruption, esteems all Adam's Posterity as guilty, and holds them as liable to Condemnation, purely on Account of that sinful Act of their first Parent; so that They, without any Respect had to their own Sin, and so, as innocent in themselves, are destin'd to eternal Punishment.—I have therefore ever been careful to show, that they do injuriously suppose those things to be separated, in our Doctrine, which are by no Means to be separated. The whole of the Controversy they have with us about this Matter, evidently arises from this, That they suppose the mediate and the immediate Imputation are distinguished one from the other, not only in the Manner of Conception, but in Reality. And so indeed they consider Imputation only as immediate, and abstractly from the mediate; when yet our Divines suppose, that neither ought to be considered separately from the other. Therefore I chose not to use any such Distinction, or to suppose any such Thing, in what I've said on the Subject; but only have endeavoured to explain the Thing it self, and to reconcile it with the divine Attributes. And therefore I have every where conjoined both these Conceptions concerning the Imputation of the first Sin, as inseparable; and judged, that one ought never to be considered without the other.—While I have been writing this Note, I consulted all the Systems of Divinity, which I have by me, that I might see what was the true and genuine Opinion of our chief Divines in this Affair; and I found that they were of the same Mind with Me; namely, That these two Kinds of Imputation are by no Means to be separated, or to be considered abstractly one from the other, but that one does involve the other.—He there particularly cites those two famous reformed Divines, Vitring, and Lampius.—Tom. iv. Cap. 17. §. 78.
The first Existence of an evil Disposition of Heart, amounting to a full Consent to Adam's Sin, no more infers God's being the Author of that evil Disposition in the Child, than in the Father. The first Arising or Existing of that evil Disposition in the Heart of Adam, was ⟨p. 331⟩by God's Permission; who could have prevented it, if he had pleased, by giving such Influences of his Spirit, as would have been absolutely effectual to hinder it: which, it is plain in Fact, he did with-hold: and whatever Mystery may be supposed in the Affair, yet no Christian will presume to say, it was not in perfect Consistence with God's Holiness and Righteousness, notwithstanding Adam had ⟨p. 332⟩been guilty of no Offence before. So Root and Branches being one, according to God's wise Constitution, the Case in Fact is, that by virtue of this Oneness answerable Changes or Effects through all the Branches co-exist with the Changes in the Root: consequently an evil Disposition exists in the Hearts of Adam's Posterity, equivalent to that which was exerted in his own Heart, when he eat the forbidden Fruit. Which God has no Hand in, any otherwise, than in not exerting such an Influence, as might be effectual to prevent it; as appears by what was observed in the former Chapter.
But now the grand Objection is against the Reasonableness of such a Constitution, by which Adam and his Posterity should be looked upon as One, and dealt with accordingly, in an Affair of such infinite Consequence; so that if Adam sinned, they must necessarily be made Sinners by his Disobedience, and come into Existence with the same Depravity of Disposition, and be looked upon and treated as th• they were Partakers with Adam in his Act of Sin.—I have not Room here to rehearse all Dr. T—r's vehement Exclamations against the Reasonableness and Justice of this. The Reader may at his Leisure consult his Book, and see them in Places referred to in the Margin. *—Whatever black Colours and frightful Representations are employed on this Occasion, all may be •um'd up in this, That Adam and his Posterity are not one, but entirely distinct Agents.—But with Respect to this mighty Out-cry made against the Reasonableness of any such Constitution, by which God is supposed to treat Adam and his Posterity as One, I would make the following Observations.
But now the grand Objection is against the Reasonableness of such a Constitution, by which Adam and his Posterity should be look'd upon as One, and dealt with accordingly, in an Affair of such infinite Consequence; so that if Adam sinned, they must necessarily be made Sinners by his Disobedience, and come into Existence with the same Depravity of Disposition, and be looked upon and treated as th• they were Partakers with Adam in his Act of Sin.—I have not Room here to rehearse all Dr. T—r's vehement Exclamations against the Reasonableness and Justice of this. The Reader may at his Leisure consult his Book, and see them in Places refer'd to in the Margin. *—Whatever black Colours and frightful Representations are employ'd on this Occasion, all may be •um'd up in this, That Adam and his Posterity are not one, but intir•ly distinct Agents.—But with Respect to this mighty Out-cry made against the Reasonableness of any such Constitution, by which God is supposed to treat Adam and his Posterity as One, I would make the following Observations.
*P. 13. 150, 151, 156, 261, 384, 387.
The author
Jonathan Edwards 1703–1758
EvangelicalsNew England
Minister at Northampton; theologian of the Great Awakening.
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My Meaning, in the whole of what has been here said, may be illustrated thus: Let us suppose, that Adam and all his Posterity had co-existed, and that his Posterity had been, thrô a Law of Nature established by the Creator, united to him, something as the Branches of a Tree are united to the Root, or the Members of the Body to the Head; so as to constitute as it were one complex Person, or one moral Whole: So that by the Law of Union there should have been a Communion and Co-existence in Acts & Affections; all jointly participating, and all concurring, as one Whole, in the Disposition & Action of the Head: as we see in the Body natural, the whole Body is affected as the Head is affected; and the whole Body concurs when the Head acts. Now, in this Case, the Hearts of all the Branches of Mankind, by the Constitution of Nature and Law of Union, would have been affected just as the Heart of Adam, their common Root, was affected. When the Heart of the Root, by a full Disposition committed the first Sin, the Hearts of all the Branches would have concurred; and when the Root, in Consequence of this, became guilty, so would all the Branches; and when the Heart of the Root, as a Punishment of the Sin committed, was forsaken of God, in like Manner would it have faired with all the Branches; and when the Heart of the Root, in Consequence of this, was confirmed in permanent Depravity, the Case would have been the same with all the Branches; and as new Guilt on the Soul of Adam would have been consequent on this, so also would it have been with his moral Branches. And thus all Things, with Relation to evil Disposition, Guilt, Pollution and Depravity, would exist, in the same Order and Dependence, in each Branch, as in the Root. Now, Difference of the Time of Existence don't at all hinder Things succeeding in the same Order, any more than Difference of Place in a Co-existence of Time. Here may be worthy to be observed, as in several Respects to the present Purpose, some Things that are said by Stapferus, an eminent Divine of Zurich in Switzerland, in his Theologia Polemica, published about fourteen Years ago;—in English as follows. Seeing all Adam's Posterity are derived from their first Parent, as their Root, the whole of the human Kind, with it's Root, may be considered as constituting but one Whole, or one Mass; so as not to be properly a Thing distinct from it's Root; the Posterity not differing from it, any otherwise than the Branches from the Tree. From which it easily appears, how that when the Root sin'd, all that which is derived from it, and with it constitutes but one Whole, may be looked upon as also sinning; seeing it is not distinct from the Root, but is one with it.—T•m. I. Chap. III. §. 856, 57. Tis objected, against the Imputation of Adam's Sin, that we never committed the same Sin with Adam, neither in Number nor in Kind. I answer, we should distinguish here between the Physical Act it self, which Adam committed, and the Morality of the Action, and Consent to it. If we have respect only to the external Act, to be sure it must be confess'd, that Adam's Posterity did not put forth their Hands to the forbidden Fruit: In which Sense, that Act of Transgression, and that Fall of Adam cannot be physically one with the Sin of his Posterity. But if we consider the Morality of the Action, and what Consent there is to it, it is altogether to be maintain'd, that his Posterity committed the same Sin, both in Number & in Kind, inasmuch as they are to be look'd upon as consenting to it. For where there is Consent to a Sin, there the same Sin is committed. Seeing therefore that Adam with all his Posterity constitute but one moral Person, and are united in the same Covenant, & are Transgressors of the same Law, they are also to be look'd upon as having, in a moral Estimation, committed the same Transgression of the Law, both in Number and in Kind. Therefore this Reasoning avails nothing against the righteous Imputation of the Sin of Adam to all Mankind, or to the whole moral Person that is consenting to it. And for the Reason mention'd, we may rather argue thus; The Sin of the Posterity, on Account of their Consent, and the moral View in which they are to be taken, is the same with the Sin of Adam, not only in Kind, but in Number; therefore the Sin of Adam is rightfully imputed to his Posterity.—Id. Tom. iv. Cap. 16. §. 60, 61. The Imputation of Adam's first Sin consists in Nothing else than this, that his Posterity are view'd as in the same Place with their Father, and are like him. But seeing, agreable to what we have already proved, God might, according to his own righteous Judgment, which was founded on his most righteous Law, give Adam a Posterity that were like himself; and indeed it could not be otherwise, according to the very Laws of Nature; therefore he might also in righteous Judgment impute Adam's Sin to them: inasmuch as to give Adam a Posterity like himself, and to impute his Sin to them, is one and the same Thing. And therefore if the former be not contrary to the divine Perfections, so neither is the latter.—Our Adversaries contend with us chiefly on this Account, That according to our Doctrine of original Sin, such an Imputation of the first Sin is maintained, whereby God, without any Regard to universal native Corruption, esteems all Adam's Posterity as guilty, and holds them as liable to Condemnation, purely on Account of that sinful Act of their first Parent; so that They, without any Respect had to their own Sin, and so, as innocent in themselves, are destin'd to eternal Punishment.—I have therefore ever been careful to shew, that they do injuriously suppose those things to be separated, in our Doctrine, which are by no Means to be separated. The whole of the Controversy they have with us about this Matter, evidently arises from this, That they suppose the mediate and the immediate Imputation are distinguished one from the other, not only in the Manner of Conception, but in Reality. And so indeed they consider Imputation only as immediate, and abstractly from the mediate; when yet our Divines suppose, that neither ought to be considered separately from the other. Therefore I chose not to use any such Distinction, or to suppose any such Thing, in what I've said on the Subject; but only have endeavoured to explain the Thing it self, and to reconcile it with the divine Attributes. And therefore I have every where conjoined both these Conceptions concerning the Imputation of the first Sin, as inseparable; and judged, that one ought never to be considered without the other.—While I have been writing this Note, I consulted all the Systems of Divinity, which I have by me, that I might see what was the true and genuine Opinion of our chief Divines in this Affair; and I found that they were of the same Mind with Me; namely, That these two Kinds of Imputation are by no Means to be separated, or to be considered abstractly one from the other, but that one does involve the other.—He there particularly cites those two famous reformed Divines, Vitring•, and Lampius.—Tom. iv. Cap. 17. §. 78.
