N07809:106
Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The…
Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The nature of true virtue. / by the late Reverend, learned and pious Jonathan Edwards, A.M. president of the College in New-Jersey.
Boston: printed by S. Kneeland, 1765
Concerning the END for which GOD created the WORLD. › Chapter 1 › Sect 4
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
NOR do any of these things argue any dependence in God on the creature for happiness. Tho' he has real pleasure in the creature's holiness and happiness; yet this is not properly any pleasure which he receives from the creature. For these things are what he gives the creature. They are wholly and entirely from him. Therefore they are nothing that they give to God by which they add to him. His rejoicing therein, is rather a rejoicing in his own acts, and his own glory expressed in those acts, than a joy derived from the creature. God's joy is dependent on nothing besides his own act, which he exerts with an absolute and independent power. And yet, in some sense it can be truly said that God has the more delight and pleasure for the holiness and happiness of his creatures. Because God would be less happy, if he was less good: or if he had not that perfection of nature which consists in a propensity of nature to diffuse of his own fullness. And he would be less happy, if it were possible for him to be hindered in the exercise of his goodness, and his other perfections in their proper effects. But he has complete happiness, because he has these perfections, and can't be hindered in exercising and displaying them in their proper effects. And this surely is not thus, because he is dependent; but because he is independent on any other that should hinder him.
NOR do any of these things argue any dependence in God on the creature for happiness. Tho' he has real pleasure in the creature's holiness and happiness; yet this is not properly any pleasure which he receives from the creature. For these things are what he gives the creature. They are wholly and entirely from him. Therefore they are nothing that they give to God by which they add to him. His rejoycing therein, is rather a rejoicing in his own acts, and his own glory expressed in those acts, than a joy derived from the creature. God's joy is dependent on nothing besides his own act, which he exerts with an absolute and independent power. And yet, in some sense it can be truly said that God has the more delight and pleasure for the holiness and happiness of his creatures. Because God would be less happy, if he was less good: or if he had not that perfection of nature which consists in a propensity of nature to diffuse of his own fulness. And he would be less happy, if it were possible for him to be hinder'd in the exercise of his goodness, and his other perfections in their proper effects. But he has compleat happiness, because he has these perfections, and can't be hindred in exercising and displaying them in their proper effects. And this surely is not thus, because he is dependent; but because he is independent on any other that should hinder him.