Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The…

2. IF any are not satisfied with the preceding answer, but still insist on the objection: let them consider whether they can devise any other scheme of God's last end in creating the world, but what will be equally obnoxious to this objection in its full force, if there be any force in it. For if God had any last end in creating the world, then there was something, in some respect future, that he aimed at, and designed to bring to pass by creating ⟨p. 36⟩the world: something that was agreeable to his inclination or will: let that be his own glory, or the happiness of his creatures, or what it will. Now if there be something that God seeks as agreeable, or grateful to him, then in the accomplishment of it he is gratified. If the last end which he seeks in the creation of the world, be truly a thing grateful to him, (as certainly it is if it be truly his end and truly the object of his will) then it is what he takes a real delight and pleasure in. But then according to the argument of the objection, how he can have any thing future to desire or seek, who is already perfectly, eternally and immutably satisfied in himself? What can remain for him to take any delight in or to be further gratified by, whose eternal and unchangeable delight is in himself as his own complete object of enjoyment. Thus the objector will be pressed with his own objection; let him embrace what notion he will of God's end in the creation. And I think he has no way left to answer but that which has been taken above.

2. IF any are not satisfyed with the preceeding answer, but still insist on the objection: let them consider whether they can devise any other scheme of God's last end in creating the world, but what will be equally obnoxious to this objection in its full force, if there be any force in it. For if God had any last end in creating the world, then there was something, in some respect future, that he aimed at, and design'd to bring to pass by creating ⟨p. 36⟩the world: something that was agreeable to his inclination or will: let that be his own glory, or the happiness of his creatures, or what it will. Now if there be something that God seeks as agreeable, or grateful to him, then in the accomplishment of it he is gratifyed. If the last end which he seeks in the creation of the world, be truly a thing grateful to him, (as certainly it is if it be truly his end and truly the object of his will) then it is what he takes a real delight and pleasure in. But then according to the argument of the objection, how he can have any thing future to desire or seek, who is already perfectly, eternally and immutably satisfied in himself? What can remain for him to take any delight in or to be further gratifyed by, whose eternal and unchangeable delight is in himself as his own compleat object of enjoyment. Thus the objector will be pressed with his own objection; let him embrace what notion he will of God's end in the creation. And I think he has no way left to answer but that which has been taken above.