N07809:121
Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The…
Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The nature of true virtue. / by the late Reverend, learned and pious Jonathan Edwards, A.M. president of the College in New-Jersey.
Boston: printed by S. Kneeland, 1765
Concerning the END for which GOD created the WORLD. › Chapter 1 › Sect 4
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
IF God's own excellency and glory is worthy to be highly valued and delighted in by him, then the value and esteem hereof by others, is worthy to be regarded by him: for this is a necessary consequence. To make this plain, let it be considered how it is with regard to the excellent qualities of another. If we highly value the virtues and excellencies of a friend, in proportion as we do so, we shall approve of and like others esteem of them; and shall disapprove and dislike the contempt of them. If these virtues are truly valuable, they are worthy that we should thus approve others esteem, and disapprove their contempt of them.—And the case is the same with respect to any Being's own qualities or attributes. If he highly esteems them, and greatly delights in them, he will naturally and necessarily love to see esteem of them in others, & dislike their disesteem. And if the attributes are worthy to be highly esteemed by the Being who hath them, so is the esteem of them in others worthy to be proportionably approved and regarded.—I desire it may be considered, whether it be unfit that God should be displeased with contempt of himself? If not, but on the contrary it be fit and suitable that he should be displeased with this, there is the same reason that he should be pleased with the proper love esteem and honour of himself.
IF God's own excellency and glory is worthy to be highly valued and delighted in by him, then the value and esteem hereof by others, is worthy to be regarded by him: for this is a necessary consequence. To make this plain, let it be considered how it is with regard to the excellent qualities of another. If we highly value the virtues and excellencies of a friend, in proportion as we do so, we shall approve of and like others esteem of them; and shall disapprove and dislike the contempt of them. If these virtues are truly valuable, they are worthy that we should thus approve others esteem, and disapprove their contempt of them.—And the case is the same with respect to any Being's own qualities or attributes. If he highly esteems them, and greatly delights in them, he will naturally and necessarily love to see esteem of them in others, & dislike their disesteem. And if the attributes are worthy to be highly esteem'd by the Being who hath them, so is the esteem of them in others worthy to be proportionably approved and regarded.—I desire it may be considered, whether it be unfit that God should be displeas'd with contempt of himself? If not, but on the contrary it be fit and suitable that he should be displeased with this, there is the same reason that he should be pleased with the proper love esteem and honor of himself.