N07809:124
Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The…
Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The nature of true virtue. / by the late Reverend, learned and pious Jonathan Edwards, A.M. president of the College in New-Jersey.
Boston: printed by S. Kneeland, 1765
Concerning the END for which GOD created the WORLD. › Chapter 1 › Sect 4
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
VIRTUE by such of the late philosophers as seem to be in chief repute, is placed in public affection or general benevolence. And if the essence of virtue lies primarily in this, then the love of virtue it self is virtuous, no otherwise, than as it is implied in or arises from this public affection, or extensive benevolence of mind. Because if a man truly loves the public, he necessarily loves Love to the public.
Now therefore, for the same reason, if universal benevolence in the highest sense, be the same thing with benevolence to the divine Being, who is in effect universal Being, it will follow, that love to virtue itself is no otherwise virtuous, than as it is implied in or arises from love to the ⟨p. 43⟩divine Being. Consequently God's own love to virtue is implied in love to himself: and is virtuous no otherwise than as it arises from love to himself. So that God's virtuous disposition, appearing in love to holiness in the creature, is to be resolved into the same thing with love to himself. And consequently whereinsoever he makes virtue his end he makes himself his end.—In fine, God being as it were an all comprehending being, all his moral perfections, as his holiness, justice, grace and benevolence are some way or other to be resolved into a supreme and infinite regard to himself: and if so it will be easy to suppose that it becomes him to make himself his supreme and last end in his works.
Now therefore, for the same reason, if universal benevolence in the highest sense, be the same thing with benevolence to the divine Being, who is in effect universal Being, it will follow, that love to virtue itself is no otherwise virtuous, than as it is implied in or arises from love to the ⟨p. 43⟩divine Being. Consequently God's own love to virtue is implied in love to himself: and is virtuous no otherwise than as it arises from love to himself. So that God's virtuous disposition, appearing in love to holiness in the creature, is to be resolved into the same thing with love to himself. And consequently whereinsoever he makes virtue his end he makes himself his end.—In fine, God being as it were an all comprehending being, all his moral perfections, as his holiness, justice, grace and benevolence are some way or other to be resolved into a supream and infinite regard to himself: and if so it will be easy to suppose that it becomes him to make himself his supream and last end in his works.