Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The…

THEY who insist that God's own glory was not an ultimate end of his creation of the world; but that all that he had any ultimate regard to wa• the happiness ⟨p. 44⟩of his creatures; and suppose that he made his creatures, and not himself his last end; do it under a colour of exalting and magnifying God's benevolence and love to his creatures.—But if his love to them be so great, and he so highly values them as to look upon them worthy to be his end in all his great works as they suppose; they are not consistent with themselves, in supposing that God has so little value for their love and esteem. For as the nature of love, especially great love causes him that loves to value the esteem of the person beloved: so that God should take pleasure in the creatures just love and esteem will follow both from God's love to himself and his love to his creatures. If he esteem and love himself, he must approve of esteem and love to himself; and disapprove the contrary. And if he loves and values the creature, he must value and take delight in their mutual love and esteem: because he loves not because he needs them.

3. As to what is alleged of its being unworthy of great men to be governed in their conduct and achievements by a regard to the applause of the populace: I would observe, what makes their applause to be worthy of so little regard, is their ignorance, giddiness and injustice. The applause of the multitude very frequently is not founded on any just view and understanding of things, but on humour, mistake, folly and unreasonable affections. Such applause is truly worthy to be disregarded—But 'tis not beneath a man of the greatest dignity and wisdom, to value the wise and just esteem of others, however inferior to him. The contrary, instead of being an expression of greatness of mind, would show an haughty and mean spirit. 'Tis such an esteem in his creatures only, that God hath any regard to: for 'tis such an esteem only that is fit and amiable in itself.

3. As to what is alledged of its being unworthy of great men to be governed in their conduct and atchievements by a regard to the applause of the populace: I would observe, what makes their applause to be worthy of so little regard, is their ignorance, giddiness and injustice. The applause of the multitude very frequently is not founded on any just view and understanding of things, but on humour, mistake, folly and unreasonable affections. Such applause is truly worthy to be disregarded—But 'tis not beneath a man of the greatest dignity and wisdom, to value the wise and just esteem of others, however inferior to him. The contrary, instead of being an expression of greatness of mind, would shew an haughty and mean spirit. 'Tis such an esteem in his creatures only, that God hath any regard to: for 'tis such an esteem only that is fit and amiable in itself.