Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The…

Pos. 6. WHATEVER appears by the scriptures to be God's last end in his main work or works of providence towards the moral world, that we justly infer to be the last end of the creation of the world. Because as was just now observed, the moral world is the chief part of the creation and the end of the rest; and God's last end in creating that part of the world, must be his last end in the creation of the whole. And it appears by the last position, that the end of God's main work or works of providence towards them, or the main use he puts them to, shows the last end for which he has made them; and consequently the main end for which he has made the whole world.

Pos. 6. WHATEVER appears by the scriptures to be God's last end in his main work or works of providence towards the moral world, that we justly infer to be the last end of the creation of the world. Because as was just now observed, the moral world is the cheif part of the creation and the end of the rest; and God's last end in creating that part of the world, must be his last end in the creation of the whole. And it appears by the last position, that the end of God's main work or works of providence towards them, or the main use he puts them to, shews the last end for which he has made them; and consequently the main end for which he has made the whole world.

Pos. 7. THAT which divine revelation shows to be God's last end with respect to that part of the moral world which are good, or which are according to his mind, or such as he would have them be; I say that which is God's last end with respect to these (i. e. his last end in their being, and in their being good) this we must suppose to be the last end of God's creating the world. For it has been already shown that God's last end in the moral part of creation must be the end of the whole. But his end in that part of the moral world that are good, must be the last end for which he has made the moral world in general. For therein consists the goodness of a thing, viz. in its fitness to answer its end: or at least this must be goodness in the eyes of the author of that thing. For goodness in his eyes is its agreeableness to his mind. But an agreeableness to his mind in what he makes for some end or use, must be an agreeableness or fitness to that end. For his end in this case is his mind. That which he chiefly aims at in that thing, is chiefly his mind with respect to that thing. And therefore they are good moral agents, who are fitted for the end for which God has made moral agents: as they are good machines, instruments and utensils that are fitted to the end they are designed for. And consequently that which is the chief end to which in being good they are fitted that is the chief end of utensils. So that which is the chief end to which good created moral agents in being good are fitted, this is the chief end of moral agents, or the moral part