Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The…

AND tho' it be true that God has respect to the creature in these things; yet his respect to himself, and to the creature in this matter, are not properly to be looked upon, as a double and divided respect of God's heart. What has been said in chap. 1. sect. 3, 4, may be sufficient to show this. Nevertheless, it may not be amiss here briefly to say a few things; tho' they are mostly implied in what has been said already.

AND tho' it be true that God has respect to the creature in these things; yet his respect to himself, and to the creature in this matter, are not properly to be looked upon, as a double and divided respect of God's heart. What has been said in chap. 1. sect. 3, 4, may be sufficient to shew this. Nevertheless, it may not be amiss here briefly to say a few things; tho' they are mostly implied in what has been said already.

WHEN God was about to create the world, he had respect to that emanation of his glory, which is actually the consequence of the creation, just as it is with regard to all that belongs to it, both with regard to its relation to himself, and the creature. He had regard to it, as an emanation from himself, and a communication of himself, and as the thing communicated, in its nature returned to himself, as its final term. And he had regard to it also, as the emanation was to the creature, and as the thing communicated was in the creature, as its subject. And God had regard to it in this manner, as he had a supreme regard to himself, and value for his own infinite internal glory. It was this value for himself that caused him to value and seek that his internal glory should flow forth from himself. It was from his value for his glorious perfections of wisdom and righteousness, &c.—that he valued the proper exercise and effect of these perfections▪ in wise and righteous acts and effects. It was from his infinite value for his ⟨p. 112⟩internal glory and fullness, that he valued the thing itself, which is communicated, which is something of the same, extant in the creature. Thus, because he infinitely values his own glory, consisting in the knowledge of himself, love to himself, and complacence and joy in himself; he therefore valued the image, communication or participation of these, in the creature. And 'tis because he values himself, that he delights in the knowledge and love and joy of the creature; as being himself the object of this knowledge, love and complacence. For it is the necessary consequence of the true esteem and love of any person or being (suppose a son or friend) that we should approve and value others esteem of the same object, and disapprove and dislike the contrary. For the same reason is it the consequence of a being's esteem and love of himself, that he should approve of others esteem and love of himself.