Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The…

LOVE is commonly distinguished into love of benevolence and love of complacence.—Love of benevolence is that affection or propensity of the heart to any Being, which causes it to incline to its well-being, or disposes it to desire and take pleasure in its happiness. And if I mistake not, 'tis agreeable to the common opinion, that beauty in the object is not always the ground of this propensity: but that there may be such a thing as benevolence, or a disposition to the welfare of those that are not considered as beautiful; unless mere existence be accounted a beauty. And benevolence or goodness in the divine Being is generally supposed, not only to be prior to the beauty of many of its objects, but to their existence: so as to be the ground both of their existence and their beauty, rather than they the ⟨p. 120⟩foundation of God's benevolence; as 'tis supposed that it is God's goodness which moved him to give them both Being and beauty. So that if all virtue primarily consists in that affection of heart to Being, which is, exercised in benevolence, or an inclination to its good, then God's virtue is so extended as to include a propensity not only to Being actually existing, & actually beautiful, but to possible Being, so as to incline him to give Being, beauty and happiness—But not now to insist particularly on this—What I would have observed at present, is, that it must be allowed, benevolence doth not necessarily presuppose beauty in its object.

LOVE is commonly distinguished into love of benevolence and love of complacence.—Love of benevolence is that affection or propensity of the heart to any Being, which causes it to incline to its well-being, or disposes it to desire and take pleasure in its happiness. And if I mistake not, 'tis agreable to the common opinion, that beauty in the object is not always the ground of this propensity: but that there may be such a thing as benevolence, or a disposition to the welfare of those that are not considered as beautiful; unless mere existence be accounted a beauty. And benevolence or goodness in the divine Being is generally supposed, not only to be prior to the beauty of many of its objects, but to their existence: so as to be the ground both of their existence and their beauty, rather than they the ⟨p. 120⟩foundation of God's benevolence; as 'tis supposed that it is God's goodness which moved him to give them both Being and beauty. So that if all virtue primarily consists in that affection of heart to Being, which is, exercised in benevolence, or an inclination to its good, then God's vertue is so extended as to include a propensity not only to Being actually existing, & actually beautiful, but to possible Being, so as to incline him to give Being, beauty and happiness—But not now to insist particularly on this—What I would have observed at present, is, that it must be allowed, benevolence doth not necessarily presuppose beauty in its object.