N07809:321
Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The…
Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The nature of true virtue. / by the late Reverend, learned and pious Jonathan Edwards, A.M. president of the College in New-Jersey.
Boston: printed by S. Kneeland, 1765
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
THEREFORE, if the essence of virtue or beauty of mind lies in lo•e, or a disposition to love, it must primarily consist in something different both from complacence, which is a delight in beauty, and also from any benevolence that has the beauty of its object for its foundation. Because 'tis absurd, to say that virtue is primarily and first of all the consequence of itself. For this makes virtue primarily prior to itself.
THEREFORE, if the essence of virtue or beauty of mind lies in lo•e, or a disposition to love, it must primarily consist in something different both from complacence, which is a de•ight in beauty, and also from any benevolence that has the beauty of its object for its foundation. Because 'tis absurd, to say that virtue is primarily and first of all the consequence of itself. For this makes virtue primarily prior to itself.
NOR can virtue primarily consist in gratitude; or one Being's benevolence to another for his benevolence to him. Because this implies the same inconsistence. For it supposes a benevolence prior to gratitude, that is the cause of gratitude. Therefore the first benevolence, or that benevolence which has none prior to it, can't be gratitude.
THEREFORE there is room left for no other conclusion than that the primary object of virtuous love is Being, simply considered; or, that true virtue primarily consists, not in love to any particular Beings, because of their virtue or beauty, nor in gratitude, because they love us; but in a propensity and union of heart to Being simply considered; exciting absolute Benevolence (if I may so call it) to Being in general.—I say, true virtue primarily consists in this. For I am far from asserting, that there is no true virtue in any other love than this absolute benevolence. But I would express what appears to me to be the truth, on this subject, in the following particulars.