N07809:340
Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The…
Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The nature of true virtue. / by the late Reverend, learned and pious Jonathan Edwards, A.M. president of the College in New-Jersey.
Boston: printed by S. Kneeland, 1765
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
2. THOUGH we are not able to give any thing to God, which we have of our own, independently; yet we may be the instruments of promoting his glory, in which he takes a true and proper delight. [As was shown at large in the former treatise, on God's end in creating the world. Chap. 1. sect. 4. Whither I must refer the reader for a more full answer to this objection.]
2. THOUGH we are not able to give any thing to God, which we have of our own, independantly; yet we may be the instruments of promoting his glory, in which he takes a true and proper delight. [As was shewn at large in the former treatise, on God's end in creating the world. Chap. 1. sect. 4. Whither I must refer the reader for a more full answer to this objection.]
WHATEVER influence such an objection may seem to have on the minds of some, yet is there any that owns the Being of a God, who will deny that any love or benevolent affection, is due to God, and proper to be exercised towards him? If no benevolence is to be exercised towards God, because we cannot profit him, then for the same reason, neither is gratitude to be exercised towards him for his benefits to us; because we cannot requite him. But where is the man, who believes a God and a providence, that will say this?
THERE seems to be an inconsistence in some writers on morality, in this respect, that they don't wholly exclude a regard to the Deity out of there schemes of morality, but yet mention it so slightly, that they leave me room and reason to suspect they esteem it a less important and a subordinate part of true morality; and insist on benevolence to the created system in such a manner, as would naturally lead one to suppose, they look upon that as by far the most important and essential thing in their scheme. But why should this be? If true virtue consists partly in a respect to God, then doubtless it consists chiefly in it. If true morality requires that we should have some regard, some benevolent affection to our creator, as well as to his creatures, then doubtless it requires the first regard to be paid to him; and that he be every way the supreme object of our benevolence I his being above our reach, and beyond all capacity of being profited by us, don't hinder but