N07809:344
Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The…
Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The nature of true virtue. / by the late Reverend, learned and pious Jonathan Edwards, A.M. president of the College in New-Jersey.
Boston: printed by S. Kneeland, 1765
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
AND therefore let it be supposed, that some Beings, by natural instinct or by some other means, have a determination of mind to union and benevolence to a particular person, or private system, *which is but a small part of the universal system of Being: and that this disposition or determination of mind is independent on, or not subordinate to benevolence, ⟨p. 129⟩to Being in general. Such a determination, disposition, or affection of mind is not of the nature of true virtue.
AND therefore let it be supposed, that some Beings, by natural instinct or by some other means, have a determination of mind to union and benevolence to a particular person, or private system, *which is but a small part of the universal system of Being: and that this disposition or determination of mind is independant on, or not subordinate to benevolence, ⟨p. 129⟩to Being in general. Such a determination, disposition, or affection of mind is not of the nature of true virtue.
- *It may be here noted, that when hereafter I use such a phrase as private system of Beings, or others similar, I thereby intend any system or society of Beings that contains but a small part of the great system comprehending the universality of existence. I think, that may well be called a private system, which is but an infinitely small part of this great whole we stand related to. I therefore also call that affection, private affection, which is limited to so narrow a circle: and that general affection or benevolence, which has Being in general for it's object.
THIS is allowed by all with regard to self love; in which, good-will is confined to one single person only. And there are the same reasons, why any other private affection or good-will tho' extending to a society of persons, independent of, and unsubordinate to, benevolence to the universality, should not be esteemed truly virtuous. For, notwithstanding it extends to a number of persons, which taken together are more than a single person, yet the whole falls infinitely short of the universality of existence; and if put in the scales with it, has no greater proportion to it than a single person.