Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The…

FROM these things, I think, it is manifest, that no affection limited to any private system, not dependent on, nor subordinate to Being in general, can be of the nature of true virtue; and this, whatever the private system be, let it be more or less extensive, consisting of a greater or smaller number of individuals, so long as it contains an infinitely little part of universal existence, and so bears no proportion to the great all-comprehending system.—And consequently, that no affection whatsoever to any creature, or any system of created beings, which is not dependent on, nor subordinate to a propensity or union of the heart to God, the supreme and infinite Being, can be of the nature of true virtue.

FROM hence also it is evident, that the divine virtue, or the virtue of the divine mind, must consist primarily in love to himself, or in the mutual love and friendship which subsists eternally and necessarily between the several persons ⟨p. 132⟩in the God-head, or that infinitely strong propensity there is in there divine persons one •o another. There is no need of multiplying words, to prove that it must be thus, on a supposition that virtue in its most essential na••e, consists in benevolent •ffect on or propensity of heart towards Being in general; and so flowing out to particular Beings, in a greater or lesser degree, according to the measure of existence and beauty which they are possessed of.—It will also follow from the foregoing things, that God's goodness and love to created Beings, is derived from, and subordinate to his love to himself. [In what manner it is so, I have endeavoured in some measure to explain in the preceding discourse of God's end in creating the world.]

FROM hence also it is evident, that the divine virtue, or the virtue of the divine mind, must consist primarily in love to himself, or in the mutual love and friendship which subsists eternally and necessarily between the several persons ⟨p. 132⟩