N07809:358
Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The…
Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The nature of true virtue. / by the late Reverend, learned and pious Jonathan Edwards, A.M. president of the College in New-Jersey.
Boston: printed by S. Kneeland, 1765
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
THOUGH this which has been spoken of, alone, is justly esteemed the true beauty of moral agents, or spiritual Beings: this alone being what would appear beautiful in them, upon a clear & comprehensive view of things: and therefore alone is the moral amiableness of Beings that have understanding and will, in the eyes of him that perfectly sees all things as they are. Yet there are other qualities, other sensations, propensities and affections of mind, and principles o• action, that often obtain the epithet of virtuous, and by many are supposed to have the nature of true virtue: which are entirely of a distinct nature from this, and have nothing of that kind; and therefore are erroneously confounded with real virtue:— ⟨p. 135⟩as may particularly and fully appear from things which will be observed in this and the following chapters.
THOUGH this which has been spoken of, alone, is justly esteemed the true beauty of moral agents, or spiritual Beings: this alone being what would appear beautiful in them, upon a clear & comprehensive view of things: and therefore alone is the moral amiableness of Beings that have understanding and will, in the eyes of him that perfectly sees all things as they are. Yet there are other qualities, other sensations, propensities and affections of mind, and principles o• action, that often obtain the epithet of virtuous, and by many are supposed to have the nature of true virtue: which are intirely of a distinct nature from this, and have nothing of that kind; and therefore are erroneously confounded with real virtue:— ⟨p. 135⟩as may particularly and fully appear from things which will be observed in this and the following chapters.
THAT consent, agreement, or union of Being to Being, which has been spoken of, viz. the union or propensity of minds to mental or spiritual existence, may be called the highest, and first, or primary beauty, that is to be found among things that exist: being the proper and peculiar beauty of spiritual and moral Beings, which are the highest and first part of the universal system, for whose sake all the rest has existence. Yet there is another, inerior, secondary beauty, which is some image of this, and which is not peculiar to spiritual Beings, but is found even in inanimate things: which consists in a mutual consent and agreement of different things, in form, manner, quantity, and visible end or design; called by the various names of regularity, order, uniformity, symmetry, proportion, harmony, &c. Such is the mutual agreement of the various sides of a square, or equilateral triangle, or of a regular polygon. Such is, as it were, the mutual consent of the different parts of the periphery of a circle, or surface of a sphere, and of the corresponding parts of an ellipsis. Such is the agreement of the colours, figures, dimensions, and distances of the different spots on a chess board. Such is the beauty of the figures on a piece of chintz, or brocade. Such is the beautiful proportion of the various parts of an human body, or countenance. And such is the sweet mutual consent and agreement of the various notes of a melodious tune. This is the same that Mr. HUTCHESON, in his treatise on beauty, expresses by uniformity in the midst of variety. Which is no other than the consent or agreement of different things, in form, quantity.&c He observes, that the greater the variety is, in equal uniformity, the greater the beauty. Which is no more than to say, the more there are of different mutually agreeing things, the greater is the beauty. And the reason of that is, because 'tis more considerable to have many things consent one with another, than a few only.