Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The…

BUT here several things may be noted:

FIRST, That when it is said, that some subordinate ends may be more valued than some ultimate ends, 'tis not supposed that ever a subordinate end is more valued than that ultimate end or ends to which it is subordinate; because a subordinate ⟨p. 5⟩end has no value, but what it derives from its ultimate end: For that reason it is called a subordinate end, because it is valued and sought, not for it's own sake, or it's own value, but only in subordination to a further end, or for the sake of the ultimate end, that it is in order to. But yet a subordinate end may be valued more than some other ultimate end that it is not subordinate to, but is independent of it, and don't belong to that series, or chain of ends. Thus for instance: If a man goes a journey to receive a sum of money, not at all as an ultimate end, or because he has any value for the silver and gold for their own sake, but only for the value of the pleasure and honour that the money may be a means of. In this case it is impossible that the subordinate end, viz. his having the money should be more valued by him than the pleasure and honour, for which he values it. It would be absurd to suppose that he values the means more than the end, when he has no value for the means but for the sake of the end, of which it is the means: But yet he may value the money, tho' but a subordinate end, more than some other ultimate end, to which it is not subordinate, and with which it has no connection. For instance, more than the comfort of a friendly visit; which was one end of his journey.

FIRST, That when it is said, that some subordinate ends may be more valued than some ultimate ends, 'tis not supposed that ever a subordinate end is more valued than that ultimate end or ends to which it is subordinate; because a subordinate ⟨p. 5⟩end has no value, but what it derives from its ultimate end: For that reason it is called a subordinate end, because it is valued and sought, not for it's own sake, or it's own value, but only in subordination to a further end, or for the sake of the ultimate end, that it is in order to. But yet a subordinate end may be valued more than some other ultimate end that it is not subordinate to, but is independent of it, and don't belong to that series, or chain of ends. Thus for instance: If a man goes a journey to receive a sum of money, not at all as an ultimate end, or because he has any value for the silver and gold for their own sake, but only for the value of the pleasure and honor that the money may be a means of. In this case it is impossible that the subordinate end, viz. his having the money should be more valued by him than the pleasure and honor, for which he values it. It would be absurd to suppose that he values the means more than the end, when he has no value for the means but for the sake of the end, of which it is the means: But yet he may value the money, tho' but a subordinate end, more than some other ultimate end, to which it is not subordinate, and with which it has no connection. For instance, more than the comfort of a friendly visit; which was one end of his journey.