N07809:38
Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The…
Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The nature of true virtue. / by the late Reverend, learned and pious Jonathan Edwards, A.M. president of the College in New-Jersey.
Boston: printed by S. Kneeland, 1765
Concerning the END for which GOD created the WORLD. › Introduction: INTRODUCTION
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
SECONDLY, Not only is a subordinate end never superior to that ultimate end, to which it is subordinate; but the ultimate end is always (not only equal but) superior to it's subordinate end, and more valued by the agent; unless it be when the ultimate end entirely depends on the subordinate: So that he has no other means by which to obtain his last end, and also is looked upon as certainly connected with it,—then the subordinate end may be as much valued as the last end; because the last end, in such a case, does altogether depend upon, and is wholly and certainly conveyed by it. As for instance, if a pregnant woman has a peculiar appetite to a certain rare fruit that is to be found only in the garden of a particular friend of her's, at a distance; and she goes a journey to go to her friend's house or garden, to obtain that fruit—the ultimate end of her journey, is to gratify that strong appetite: The obtaining that fruit, is the subordinate end of it. If she looks upon it, that the appetite can be gratified by no other means than the obtaining that fruit; and that it will certainly be gratified if she obtains it, ⟨p. 6⟩then she will value the fruit as much as she values the gratification of her appetite. But otherwise, it will not be so: If she be doubtful whether that fruit will satisfy her craving, then she will not value it equally with the gratification of her appetite itself; or if there be some other fruit that she knows of, that will gratify her desire, at least in part; which she can obtain without such inconvenience or trouble as shall countervail the gratification; which is in effect, frustrating her of her last end, because her last end is the pleasure of gratifying her appetite, without any trouble that shall countervail, and in effect destroy it. Or if it be so, that her appetite cannot be gratified without this fruit, nor yet with it alone, without something else to be compounded with it,—then her value for her last end will be divided between these several ingredients as so many subordinate, and no one alone will be equally valued with the last end.
HENCE it rarely happens among mankind, that a subordinate end is equally valued with it's last end; because the obtaining of a last end rarely depends on one single, uncompounded means, and is infallibly connected with that means: Therefore, mens last ends are commonly their highest ends.