Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The…

THEY say, that the reason why we are affected with gratitude and anger towards men, rather than things without life, is moral sense: which they say, is the effect of that principle of benevolence or love to others, or love to the public, which is naturally in the hearts of all mankind.—But now I might say, according to their own way of arguing, gratitude and anger cannot arise from love to others, or love to the public, or any sense of mind that is the fruit of public affection. For, how differently are we affected towards those that do good or hurt to the public from understanding and will, and from a general public spirit, or public motive,—I say, how differently affected are we towards these, from what we are towards such inanimate things as the sun and the clouds, that do good to the public, by enlightening and enlivening beams and refreshing showers; or mildew, and an overflowing stream, that does hurt to the public, by destroying the fruits of the earth! Yea, if such a kind of argument be good, it will prove that ⟨p. 151⟩gratitude and anger cannot arise from the united influence of self-love, and public love, or moral sense arising from public affection. For, if so, why are we not affected towards inanimate things, that are beneficial or injurious both to us and the public, in the same manner as to them that are profitable or hurtful to both on choice and design, and from benevolence, or malice?

THEY say, that the reason why we are affected with gratitude and anger towards men, rather than things without life, is moral sense: which they say, is the effect of that principle of benevolence or love to others, or love to the public, which is naturally in the hearts of all mankind.—But now I might say, according to their own way of arguing, gratitude and anger cannot arise from love to others, or love to the public, or any sense of mind that is the fruit of public affection. For, how differently are we affected towards those that do good or hurt to the public from understanding and will, and from a general public spirit, or public motive,—I say, how differently affected are we towards these, from what we are towards such inanimate things as the sun and the clouds, that do good to the public, by enlightning and enlivening beams and refreshing showers; or mildew, and an overflowing stream, that does hurt to the public, by destroying the fruits of the earth! Yea, if such a kind of argument be good, it will prove that ⟨p. 151⟩