Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The…

2. On the supposition of its being indeed so, that men love those who love them, & are angry with those who hate them, from the natural influence of self-love; 'tis not at all strange that the author of nature, who observes order, uniformity and harmony in establishing its laws, should so order that it should be natural for self-love to cause the mind to be affected differently towards exceedingly different objects; and that it should cause our heart to extend itself in one manner towards inanimate things, which gratify self-love, without sense or will, and in another manner towards Beings which we look upon as having understanding and will, like ourselves, and exerting these faculties in our favour, and promoting our interest from love to us. No wonder, seeing we love ourselves, that it should be natural to us to extend something of that same kind of love which we have for ourselves, to them who are the same kind of Beings as ourselves, and comply with the inclinations of our self-love, by expressing the same sort of love towards us.

2. On the supposition of its being indeed so, that men love those who love them, & are angry with those who hate them, from the natural influence of self-love; 'tis not at all strange that the author of nature, who observes order, uniformity and harmony in establishing its laws, should so order that it should be natural for self-love to cause the mind to be affected differently towards exceedingly different objects; and that it should cause our heart to extend itself in one manner towards inanimate things, which gratify self-love, without sense or will, and in another manner towards Beings which we look upon as having understanding and will, like ourselves, and exerting these faculties in our favor, and promoting our interest from love to us. No wonder, seeing we love ourselves, that it should be natural to us to extend something of that same kind of love which we have for ourselves, to them who are the same kind of Beings as ourselves, and comply with the inclinations of our self-love, by expressing the same sort of love towards us.

3. IF we should allow that to be universal, that in gratitude and anger there is the exercise of some kind of moral sense (as 'tis granted, there is something that may be so called.) All the moral sense, that is essential to those affections, is a sense of DESERT; which is to be referred to that sense of justice, before spoken of, consisting in an apprehension of that secondary kind of beauty, that lies in uniformity and proportion: which solves all the difficulty in the objection.—This, or some appearance of it, to a narrow private view, indeed attends all anger and gratitude. Others love and kindness to us, or their ill-will and injuriousness, appears to us to deserve our love, or our resentment. Or, in other words, it seems to us no other than just, that as they love us, and do us good, we also should love them,