Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The…

4. THOSE authors, who hold that that moral sense which is natural to all man-kind, consists in a natural relish of the beauty of virtue, and so arises from a principle of true virtue implanted by nature in the hearts of all—they hold that true virtue consists in public benevolence. Therefore, if the affections of gratitude and anger necessarily imply such a moral sense as they suppose, then these affections imply some delight in the public good, and an aversion of the mind to public evil. And if this were so, then every time any man feels anger for opposition he meets with, or gratitude for any favour, there must be at least a supposition of a tendency to public injury in that opposition, and a tendency to public benefit in the favour that excites his gratitude. But how far is this from being true? As, in such instances as these, which, I presume, none will deny to be possible, or unlike to any thing that ⟨p. 153⟩ever happens among mankind. A ship's crew enter into a conspiracy against the master, to murder him, and run away with the ship, and turn pirates: but before they bring their matters to a ripeness for execution, one of them repents, and opens the whole design; whereupon the rest are apprehended and brought to justice. The crew are enraged with him that has betrayed them, and earnestly seek opportunity to revenge themselves upon him.—And for an instance of gratitude, a gang of robbers that have long infested the neighbouring country, have a particular house whither they resort, and where they meet from time to time, to divide their booty or prey, and hold their consultations for carrying on their pernicious designs. The magistrates and officers of the country, after many fruitless endeavours to discover their secret haunt and place of resort, at length by some means are well informed where it is, and are prepared with sufficient force to surprise them, and seize them all, at the place of rendezvous, at an hour appointed when they understand they will all be there. A little before the arrival of the appointed hour, while the officers with their bands are approaching, some person is so kind to these robbers, as to give them notice of their danger, so as just to give them opportunity to escape.

4. THOSE authors, who hold that that moral sense which is natural to all man-kind, consists in a natural relish of the beauty of virtue, and so arises from a principle of true virtue implanted by nature in the hearts of all—they hold that true virtue consists in publick benevolence. Therefore, if the affections of gratitude and anger necessarily imply such a moral sense as they suppose, then these affections imply some delight in the publick good, and an aversion of the mind to publick evil. And if this were so, then every time any man feels anger for opposition he meets with, or gratitude for any favour, there must be at least a supposition of a tendency to publick injury in that opposition, and a tendency to publick benefit in the favour that excites his gratitude. But how far is this from being true? As, in such instances as these, which, I presume, none will deny to be possible, or unlike to any thing that