N07809:428
Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The…
Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The nature of true virtue. / by the late Reverend, learned and pious Jonathan Edwards, A.M. president of the College in New-Jersey.
Boston: printed by S. Kneeland, 1765
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
2. THE other thing which belongs to the approbation or disapprobation of natural conscience, is the sense of desert, which was spoken of before: consisting, as was observed, in a natural agreement, proportion and harmony between malevolence or injury and resentment and punishment; or between loving and being loved, between showing kindness and being rewarded, &c. Both these kinds ⟨p. 163⟩of approving or disapproving concur in the approbation or disapprobation of conscience: the one founded on the other. Thus, when a man's conscience disapproves of his treatment of his neighbour, in the first place he is conscious that if he were in his neighbours stead, he should resent such treatment, from a sense of justice, or from a sense of uniformity and equality between such treatment and resentment and punishment; as before explained. And then in the next place he perceives, that therefore he is not consistent with himself, in doing what he himself should resent in that case; and hence disapproves it, as being naturally averse to opposition to himself.
2. THE other thing which belongs to the approbation or disapprobation of natural conscience, is the sense of desert, which was spoken of before: consisting, as was observed, in a natural agreement, proportion and harmony between malevolence or injury and resentment and punishment; or between loving and being loved, between shewing kindness and being rewarded, &c. Both these kinds ⟨p. 163⟩of approving or disapproving concur in the approbation or disapprobation of conscience: the one founded on the other. Thus, when a man's conscience disapproves of his treatment of his neighbour, in the first place he is conscious that if he were in his neighbours stead, he should resent such treatment, from a sense of justice, or from a sense of uniformity and equality between such treatment and resentment and punishment; as before explained. And then in the next place he perceives, that therefore he is not consistent with himself, in doing what he himself should resent in that case; and hence disapproves it, as being naturally averse to opposition to himself.