Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The…

AND thus, in particular, we may see in what respect this natural conscience that has been described, extends to true virtue, consisting in union of heart to Being in general, and supreme love to God. For, although' it sees not, or rather does not taste its primary and essential beauty, i. e. it tastes no sweetness in benevolence to Being in general, simply considered, or loves i• not for Being in general's sake (for nothing but general benevolence itself can do that) yet this natural conscience. common to mankind, may approve of it from that uniformity, equality and justice, which there is in it, and the demerit which is seen in the contrary, consisting in the natural agreement between the contrary and being hated of Being in general. Men by natural conscience may see the justice (or natural agreement) there is in yielding all to God, as we receive all from God; and the justice there is in being his that has made us, and being willingly so, which is the same as being dependent on his will, and conformed to his will in the manner of our Being, as we are for our Being itself, and in the conformity of our will to his will, on whose will we are universally and most perfectly dependent; and also the justice there is in our supreme love to God, from his goodness,—the natural agreement there is between our having supreme respect to him who exercises infinite goodness to us, and from whom we receive all well-being.—Besides that disagreement and discord appears worse to natural sense (as was observed before) in things nearly related and of great importance: and therefore it must appear very ill, as it respects the infinite Being, and in that infinitely great relation which there is between the creator and his creatures. And 'tis easy to conceive how that sense which is in natural conscience, should see the desert of punishment, which there is in the contrary of true virtue, viz. opposition and enmity to Being in general. For, this is only to see the natural agreement there is between opposing Being in general, and being opposed by Being in general; with a consciousness how that if we were infinitely great. we should expect to be regarded according to our greatness, and should proportionably resent contempt. Thus natural conscience, if well informed, will approve of true virtue, and will disapprove and condemn the want of it, and opposition to it;

AND thus, in particular, we may see in what respect this natural conscience that has been described, extends to true virtue, consisting in union of heart to Being in general, and supreme love to God. For, altho' it sees not, or rather does not taste its primary and essential beauty, i. e. it tastes no sweetness in benevolence to Being in general, simply considered, or loves i not for Being in general's sake (for nothing but general benevolence itself can do that) yet this natural conscience. common to mankind, may approve of it from that uniformity, equality and justice, which there is in it, and the demerit which is seen in the contrary, consisting in the natural agreement between the contrary and being hated of Being in general. Men by natural conscience may see the justice (or natural agreement) there is in yielding all to God, as we receive all from God; and the justice there is in being his that has made us, and being willingly so, which is the same as being dependent on his will, and conformed to his will in the manner of our Being, as we are for our Being itself, and in the conformity of our will to his will, on whose will we are universally and most perfectly dependent; and also the justice there is in our supreme love to God, from his goodness,—the natural agreement there is between our having supreme respect to him who exercises infinite goodness to us, and from whom we receive all well-being.—Besides that disagreement and discord appears worse to natural sense (as was observed before) in things nearly related and of great importance: and therefore it must appear very ill, as it respects the infinite Being, and in that infinitely great relation which there is between the creator and his creatures. And 'tis easy to conceive how that sense which is in natural conscience, should see the desert of punishment, which there is in the contrary of true virtue, viz. opposition and enmity to Being in general. For, this is only to see the natural agreement there is between opposing Being in general, and being opposed by Being in general; with a consciousness how that if we were infinitely great. we should expect to be regarded according to our greatness, and should proportionably resent contempt. Thus natural conscience, if well inform'd, will approve of true virtue, and will disapprove and condemn the want of it, and opposition to it;