N07809:455
Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The…
Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The nature of true virtue. / by the late Reverend, learned and pious Jonathan Edwards, A.M. president of the College in New-Jersey.
Boston: printed by S. Kneeland, 1765
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
The reasons why those things that have been mentioned, which have not the essence of virtue, have yet by many been mistaken for true virtue.
THE first reason that may be given of this, is, that although' they have not the specific and distinguishing nature and essence of virtue, yet they have something that belongs to the general nature of virtue.—The general nature of true virtue is love. It is expressed both in love of benevolence and complacence; but primarily in benevolence to persons and Beings, and consequently and secondarily in complacence in virtue,—as has been shown. There is something of the general nature of virtue in those natural affections and principles that have been mentioned, in both those respects.
THE first reason that may be given of this, is, that altho' they have not the specific and distinguishing nature and essence of virtue, yet they have something that belongs to the general nature of virtue.—The general nature of true virtue is love. It is expressed both in love of benevolence and complacence; but primarily in benevolence to persons and Beings, and consequently and secondarily in complacence in virtue,—as has been shewn. There is something of the general nature of virtue in those natural affections and principles that have been mentioned, in both those respects.
IN many of these natural affections there is something of the appearance of love to persons. In some of them there appears the tendency and effect of benevolence, in part. Others have truly a sort of benevolence in them, tho' it be a private benevolence, and in several respects falls short of the extent of true virtuous benevolence, both in its nature and object.