Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The…

So that perfection of God which we call his faithfulness, or his inclination to fulfil his promises to his creatures, could not properly be what moved him to create the world; nor could such a fulfilment of his promises to his creatures, be his last end, in giving the creatures being. But yet after the world is created, after intelligent creatures are made, and God has bound himself by promise to them, then that disposition which is called his faithfulness may move him in his providential disposals towards them: And this may be the end of many of God's works of providence, even the exercise ⟨p. 9⟩of his faithfulness in fulfilling his promises. And may be in the lower sense his last end. Because faithfulness and truth must be supposed to be what is in itself amiable to God, and what he delights in for its own sake. Thus God may have ends of particular works of providence, which are ultimate ends in a lower sense, which were not ultimate ends of the creation.

So that here we have two sorts of ultimate ends; one of which may be called an original, and independent ultimate end; the other consequential and dependent. For 'tis evident, the latter sort are truly of the nature of ultimate ends: Because, tho' their being agreeable to the agent, or the agent's desire of them, be consequential on the existence, or supposition of proper subjects and occasion; yet the subject and occasion being supposed, they are agreeable and amiable in themselves. We may suppose that to a righteous Being, the doing justice between two parties, with whom he is concerned, is agreeable in itself, and is loved for it's own sake, and not merely for the sake of some other end: And yet we may suppose, that a desire of doing justice between two parties, may be consequential on the being of those parties, and the occasion given.

So that here we have two sorts of ultimate ends; one of which may be called an original, and independent ultimate end; the other consequential and dependent. For 'tis evident, the latter sort are truly of the nature of ultimate ends: Because, tho' their being agreable to the agent, or the agent's desire of them, be consequential on the existence, or supposition of proper subjects and occasion; yet the subject and occasion being supposed, they are agreable and amiable in themselves. We may suppose that to a righteous Being, the doing justice between two parties, with whom he is concerned, is agreable in itself, and is loved for it's own sake, and not merely for the sake of some other end: And yet we may suppose, that a desire of doing justice between two parties, may be consequential on the being of those parties, and the occasion given.