N07809:48
Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The…
Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The nature of true virtue. / by the late Reverend, learned and pious Jonathan Edwards, A.M. president of the College in New-Jersey.
Boston: printed by S. Kneeland, 1765
Concerning the END for which GOD created the WORLD. › Introduction: INTRODUCTION
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
So that here we have two sorts of ultimate ends; one of which may be called an original, and independent ultimate end; the other consequential and dependent. For 'tis evident, the latter sort are truly of the nature of ultimate ends: Because, tho' their being agreeable to the agent, or the agent's desire of them, be consequential on the existence, or supposition of proper subjects and occasion; yet the subject and occasion being supposed, they are agreeable and amiable in themselves. We may suppose that to a righteous Being, the doing justice between two parties, with whom he is concerned, is agreeable in itself, and is loved for it's own sake, and not merely for the sake of some other end: And yet we may suppose, that a desire of doing justice between two parties, may be consequential on the being of those parties, and the occasion given.
So that here we have two sorts of ultimate ends; one of which may be called an original, and independent ultimate end; the other consequential and dependent. For 'tis evident, the latter sort are truly of the nature of ultimate ends: Because, tho' their being agreable to the agent, or the agent's desire of them, be consequential on the existence, or supposition of proper subjects and occasion; yet the subject and occasion being supposed, they are agreable and amiable in themselves. We may suppose that to a righteous Being, the doing justice between two parties, with whom he is concerned, is agreable in itself, and is loved for it's own sake, and not merely for the sake of some other end: And yet we may suppose, that a desire of doing justice between two parties, may be consequential on the being of those parties, and the occasion given.
THEREFORE I make a distinction between an end that in this manner is consequential, and a subordinate end.
IT may be observed, that when I speak of God's ultimate end in the creation of the world, in the following discourse, I commonly mean in that highest sense, viz. the original ultimate end.