Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The…

VIRTUE, as I have observed, consists in the cordial consent or union of Being to Being in general. And, as has also been observed, that frame of mind, whereby it is disposed to relish and be pleased with the view of this, is benevolence or union of heart itself to Being in general, or a universally benevolent frame of mind: because he whose temper is to ⟨p. 186⟩love Being in general, therein must have a disposition to approve and be pleased with love to Being in general. Therefore now the question is, whether God in giving this temper to a created mind, whereby it unites to or loves Being in general, acts so arbitrarily, that there is nothing in the necessary nature of things to hinder but that a contrary temper might have agreed or consisted as well with that nature of things, as this?

AND in the first place I observe, that to assert this, would be a plain absurdity, and contrary to the very supposition. For here 'tis supposed, that virtue in its very essence consists in agreement or consent of Being to Being. Now certainly agreement itself to Being in general must necessarily agree better with general existence, than opposition & contrariety to it.

I OBSERVE secondly, that God in giving to the creature such a temper of mind, gives that which is agreeable to what is by absolute necessity his own temper and nature. For, as has been often observed, God himself is in effect▪ Being in general; and without all doubt it is in itself necessary, and impossible it should be otherwise, that God should agree with himself, be united with himself, or love himself: and therefore, when he gives the same temper to his creatures, this is more agreeable to his necessary nature, than the opposite temper: yea, the latter would be infinitely contrary to his nature.