N07809:483
Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The…
Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The nature of true virtue. / by the late Reverend, learned and pious Jonathan Edwards, A.M. president of the College in New-Jersey.
Boston: printed by S. Kneeland, 1765
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
AND in the first place I observe, that to assert this, would be a plain absurdity, and contrary to the very supposition. For here 'tis supposed, that virtue in its very essence consists in agreement or consent of Being to Being. Now certainly agreement itself to Being in general must necessarily agree better with general existence, than opposition & contrariety to it.
I OBSERVE secondly, that God in giving to the creature such a temper of mind, gives that which is agreeable to what is by absolute necessity his own temper and nature. For, as has been often observed, God himself is in effect▪ Being in general; and without all doubt it is in itself necessary, and impossible it should be otherwise, that God should agree with himself, be united with himself, or love himself: and therefore, when he gives the same temper to his creatures, this is more agreeable to his necessary nature, than the opposite temper: yea, the latter would be infinitely contrary to his nature.
I OBSERVE secondly, that God in giving to the creature such a temper of mind, gives that which is agreable to what is by absolute necessity his own temper and nature. For, as has been often observed, God himself is in effect▪ Being in general; and without all doubt it is in itself necessary, and impossible it should be otherwise, that God should agree with himself, be united with himself, or love himself: and therefore, when he gives the same temper to his creatures, this is more agreable to his necessary nature, than the opposite temper: yea, the latter would be infinitely contrary to his nature.
LET it be noted, thirdly, by this temper only can created Beings be united to, and agree with one another. This appears, because it consists in consent and union to Being in general; which implies agreement and union with every particular Being, except such as are opposite to Being in general, or excepting such cases wherein union with them is by some means inconsistent with union with general existence. But certainly if any particular created Being were of a temper to oppose Being in general, that would infer the most universal and greatest possible discord, not only of creatures with their creator, but of created Beings one with another.