N07809:64
Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The…
Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The nature of true virtue. / by the late Reverend, learned and pious Jonathan Edwards, A.M. president of the College in New-Jersey.
Boston: printed by S. Kneeland, 1765
Concerning the END for which GOD created the WORLD. › Chapter 1 › Section 1
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
2. WHATSOEVER is good & valuable in itself, is worthy that God should value for itself, & on it's own account; or which is the same thing, value it with an ultimate value or respect. It is therefore worthy to be ultimately sought by God, or made the last end of his action and operation; if it be a thing of such a nature as to be properly capable of being attained in any divine operation. For it may be supposed that some things, which are valuable and excellent in themselves, are not properly capable of being attained in any divine operation; because they do not remain to be attained; but their existence in all possible respects, must be conceived of as prior to any divine operation. Thus God's existence and infinite perfection, tho' infinitely valuable in themselves, and infinitely valued by God, yet can't be supposed to be the end of any divine operation. For we can't conceive of them as in any respect consequent on any works of God:—But whatever is in itself valuable, absolutely so, and that is capable of being sought and attained, is worthy to be made a last end of the divine operation.—Therefore,
2. WHATSOEVER is good & valuable in itself, is worthy that God shou'd value for itself, & on it's own account; or which is the same thing, value it with an ultimate value or respect. It is therefore worthy to be ultimately sought by God, or made the last end of his action and operation; if it be a thing of such a nature as to be properly capable of being attained in any divine operation. For it may be supposed that some things, which are valuable and excellent in themselves, are not properly capable of being attained in any divine operation; because they do not remain to be attained; but their existence in all possible respects, must be conceiv'd of as prior to any divine operation. Thus God's existence and infinite perfection, tho' infinitely valuable in themselves, and infinitely valued by God, yet can't be supposed to be the end of any divine operation. For we can't conceive of them as in any respect consequent on any works of God:—But whatever is in itself valuable, absolutely so, and that is capable of being sought and attained, is worthy to be made a last end of the divine operation.—Therefore,