Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The…

3. WHATEVER that be which is in itself most valuable, and was so originally, prior to the creation of the world▪ and which is attainable by the creation, if there be any thing which was superior in value to all others, that must be worthy to be God's last end in the creation; and also worthy to be his highest end.—In consequence of this, it will follow,

4. THAT if God himself be in any respect properly capable of being his own end in the creation of the world, then ⟨p. 14⟩it is reasonable to suppose that he had respect to himself as his last and highest end in this work; because he is worthy in himself to be so, being infinitely the greatest and best of Beings. All things else, with regard to worthiness, importance and excellence, are perfectly as nothing in comparison of him. And therefore if God esteems, values, and has respect to things according to their nature and proportions, he must necessarily have the greatest respect to himself. It would be against the perfection of his nature, his wisdom, holiness, and perfect rectitude, whereby he is disposed to do every thing that is fit to be done, to suppose otherwise. At least a great part of the moral rectitude of the heart of God, whereby he is disposed to every thing that is fit, suitable and amiable in itself, consists in his having infinitely the highest regard to that which is in itself infinitely highest and best: Yea it is in this that it seems chiefly to consist.—The moral rectitude of God's heart must consist in a proper and due respect of his heart to things that are objects of moral respect: That is, to intelligent beings capable of moral actions and relations. And therefore it must chiefly consist in giving due respect to that Being to whom most is due; yea infinitely most, and in effect all. For God is infinitely the most worthy of regard. The worthiness of others is as nothing to his: So that to him belongs all possible respect. To him belongs the whole of the respect that any moral agent, either God, or any intelligent Being is capable of. To him belongs all the heart—Therefore if moral rectitude of heart consists in paying the respect or regard of the heart which is due, or which fitness & suitableness requires, fitness requires infinitely the greatest regard to be paid to God; and the denying supreme regard here, would be a conduct infinitely the most unfit. Therefore a proper regard to this Being, is what the fitness of regard does infinitely most consist in.—Hence it will follow—that the moral rectitude and fitness of the disposition, inclination or affection of God's heart, does chiefly consist in a respect or regard to himself infinitely above his regard to all other beings: Or in other words, his holiness consists in this.